DOES GOVERNANCE QUALITY AFFECT THE PROBABILITY OF CIVIL UNREST?

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/signed/   /signed/

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Abstract

This study investigates the relationship between the quality of governance and the occurrence of civil unrest. We construct our sample from two datasets: (a) Kaufmann and Kraay's (1999) World Governance Indicators (WGI) for measures of governance quality and (b) Clark and Regan's (2016) Mass Mobilization Data (MMD) for information on civil unrest episodes around the world. We employ the linear probability model to investigate how different dimensions of governance quality affect the likelihood of: (1) civil unrest episodes, (2) violent episodes of civil unrest, and (3) large-scale episodes of civil unrest (in which more than 0.025% of a country's population participates). We find that in a global sample, higher levels of Political Stability and Voice and Accountability are associated with a lower likelihood of civil unrest. Moreover, countries with higher scores in Political Stability are also less likely to experience violent episodes of unrest. We then show that this effect is more pronounced for more advanced a country.

1. Introduction

The economic and political consequences of civil unrest can differ widely. A peaceful protest in most cases has little to no economic impact, however, violent demonstrations or riots can be very destructive for an economy and individuals. According to Smith (2023), over the years since 2015, episodes of civil unrest have brought $10bn loss to the insurance industry all over the world. Barrett et al. (2021) show that firm profitability declines by 1.4 percentage points over a fortnight after an average event of civil unrest. Moreover, the country's economic standing is also negatively impacted by civil disorder. Hadzi-Vaskov et al. (2021) found that a bigger-than-average increase in the Reported Social Unrest Index leads to a 1 percentage point drop in GDP in the medium-term future.

Apart from lower economic growth, civil unrest also has a non-negligible influence on the political arena. Most of the political consequences are related to abrupt changes in leadership or the governing system of a country, e.g. Moldova on April 7th, 2009 – a 2-day violent and disastrous riot led to the dissolving of the parliament and switching from a neo-communist system to a liberal one (Ziarul de Gardă, 2021). Previous studies have argued that peaceful protests achieve their goals way more often than violent ones (Braithwaite et al., 2014) and that a high quality of governance is a precondition for civil unrest to be able to contribute to public welfare (Venger & Miethe, 2017).

Given the economic and political costs associated with the prevalence of civil unrest, previous literature has investigated potential causes and factors associated with such episodes. These predictors can be broadly categorised into socio-economic factors and political factors. Among the socio-economic factors, previous literature has identified the Gini index (Yang et al., 2019), unemployment rates (Myers, 1997), and food prices (Weinberg & Bakker, 2014). Political predictors mostly relate to the public perception of welfare policies (Abi-Nassif et al., 2020; Bulutgil & Prasad, 2022).

Despite gathering evidence on an extensive set of predictors of civil unrest, little attention has been paid to governance quality. One exemption is a study by Venger and Miethe (2017), which finds that World Governance Indicators (WGI), introduced by Kaufmann and Kraay (1999), and the Fragile States Index, introduced by the Fund for Peace, are good predictors for determining the place and time of future revolutionary events. However, they focus on a narrow sample of 26 countries that have been through revolutions.

There are several reasons why the quality of governance could affect the probability of civil unrest. First, it directly relates to the perception of citizens on the political stability of a country. Previous literature has already highlighted the role of public perceptions (Abi-Nassif et al., 2020; Bulutgil & Prasad, 2022). Second, constantly elevated levels of corruption and inefficient governing institutions can potentially lead to growing popular dissatisfaction (Lum, 2006).

Therefore this study tries to answer the following research question:

How does governance quality affect the probability of civil unrest?

To answer this research question, we rely on Mass Mobilization Data (MMD) compiled by Clark and Regan (2016) and World Governance Indicators by Kaufmann and Kraay (1999) and employ a linear probability model. Our sample consists of 152 countries covering the period from 1990 until 2020.

The novelty of our study is twofold.. First, we provide evidence on how the quality of governance, measured by the WGIs, affects the occurrence of civil unrest globally and in different country subsamples. We split our baseline sample into: (a) subsamples based on economic development, (b) continental subsamples, and (c) subsamples based on political regime. Previous literature has largely paid attention to only a specific group of countries (Venger & Miethe, 2017). Second, we explore three different definitions of civil unrest: any episode registered in the MMD, violent episodes, and episodes in which at least 0.025% of the country's population participated, which we call "significant episodes".

We find robust evidence that higher levels of Political Stability and Voice and Accountability are associated with a lower probability of civil unrest. Moreover, we show that these indicators matter more in Advanced economies (if compared to Developing economies), as well as full democracies (if compared to flawed democracies and authoritarian regimes). We also show that countries with higher scores in Political Stability are less likely to experience violent episodes of social unrest. Other indicators, namely Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality and Rule of Law show a less robust relation to the episodes of civil unrest. We find little to no evidence that WGIs affect the occurrence of significant episodes of unrest (episodes where more than 0.025% of the population participates).

This paper is structured as follows. The next Section reviews the relevant literature on the consequences of civil unrest and the predictors of unrest. Section 3 introduces the data sample used in empirical analysis and presents descriptive statistics.

Section 4 outlines the methodology used to answer our research question. Sections 5 and 6 present the results and discuss the implications. The last section contains our conclusions.

2. Literature review

Over the years, academic literature has struggled to set an exact definition for civil unrest or to get a distinct set of parameters and characteristics that would classify a certain episode as civil unrest[1]. According to Schröter et al. (2014), civil unrest is a set of social movements organised by a group of people.

Usually, these manifestations reflect a popular disapproval of social, economic, or political changes, initiated or undertaken by the government (Braha, 2012). Moreover, the civilian demonstrations that fall under the category of unrest can be either peaceful or violent, i.e. protests, riots, strikes, but not acts of terrorism (Basedau et al., 2018). Kalyvas (2000) adds a precondition that these episodes must take place when the country is in a state of peace, i.e. absence of war or emergency protocol.

The political, social and economic costs of certain episodes can vary significantly, starting with little to no effect and ending with mass casualties and ravaged infrastructure (Evans, 1993). Therefore, previous literature has paid a lot of attention to the socio-economic and financial costs of civil unrest.

Using data from industry reports, Smith (2023) concludes that civil unrest has surpassed terrorism and natural disasters as the main threat to business and property owners around the world when it comes to insurance claims. His conclusions are based on 3 major civil unrest movements that have taken part across 3 continents in the years 2019-2021, including mass protests related to Black Lives Matter in the USA.

Increased risks and uncertainty that could disrupt operations and potentially affect capital have detrimental effects on firm performance. Espinosa-Méndez (2022) uses information for the years 2017-2020 on public companies that are part of the Santiago de Chile Stock Exchange. He finds that sectors that have been most exposed to civil unrest episodes, such as Trade and Industrial, show poorer financial results.

Similarly, Barrett et al. (2021) find evidence that the profitability of listed firms diminishes by 1.4 percentage points in a couple of weeks from the outset of an average unrest event. Furthermore, the downturn is further exacerbated if (a) the firm is located

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[1] In this study, terms *civil disorder* and *social unrest* will be used as synonyms for civil unrest.

in emerging economies and (b) if the violence intensifies and the length of the civil unrest episode increases.

Apart from negatively impacting general firm or industry performances, civil unrest also adversely affects general economic factors. Hadzi-Vaskov et al. (2021) used the Reported Social Unrest Index, introduced by Barrett et al. (2020), to determine the impact of civil disorder events on GDP. Using a sample of 89 countries over the years 1990-2019, they find that an increase of one standard deviation of the social unrest variable leads to a 0.15 percentage point decline in quarter-on-quarter GDP growth. Moreover, a decline of 0.2 percentage points persists for 6 quarters after the beginning of an average civil unrest event. They also provide evidence that emerging markets are affected to a greater extent, and that unrest episodes caused by socio-economic factors leave a larger adverse impact on GDP, than politically-driven episodes.

Hadzi-Vaskov et al. (2021) conclude that an unrest episode negatively affects manufacturing and services industries, the contraction of which, is the main contributor to the decrease in GDP. Complementary conclusions are drawn by Aldrich and Reiss (1970) and Bean (2000), who analyzed the riots in the USA in the 1960s. Both papers evaluate the impact of civil unrest on small businesses and find that the ones that suffered the most from looting and destruction were the ones in retail and services industries. Correspondingly, they emphasize the vulnerability of such companies to recover, leading to a drop in local economic growth.

Another branch of literature has focused on the political and social consequences of civil unrest. While the drop in economic activity following a civil disorder episode is instant and can be felt immediately, the political and social changes driven by unrest can become visible only in the long term.

These consequences also differ depending on the type of civil unrest and its magnitude. A peaceful protest can be easily ignored by the government, especially if the political system is not very transparent and prone to corruption (Ortiz et al., 2022). In turn, a more violent and lengthy demonstration can lead to more severe changes.

Another dimension is the nature of the cause of the unrest, for example, whether it is a one-off event or a chronic outcome of popular discontent. For example, Fearon and Laitin (2001), argue that civil unrest episodes that occur regularly, are the ones that more frequently lead to policy modifications, regime changes, and, in extreme cases, civil war and rebellions. Additionally, Justino (2007) suggests that policymakers should focus on

the root cause of the unrest episode and take into account protesters' demand to decrease the probability of future unrest or the possible severe escalations mentioned above.

Despite the possible violent nature and negative short-term consequences, civil unrest can also lead to positive changes in the long term. Schram and Turbett (1983) find empirical evidence that the riots in the early 1960s in the USA caused a significant welfare increase towards the end of the decade. They show that states which were affected the most by the riots were also the ones that acted the most by implementing new welfare policies.

Given that civil unrest leads to negative consequences most of the time, another branch of literature has focused on predictive models to determine the likelihood, location, and even timing of future episodes of unrest. The current popularity of social media makes it easier to determine the aspects mentioned above. According to Smith (2023), over the last decade, social media platforms have been extensively used for premeditating and organizing civil unrest events. Mbunge et al. (2017) also highlight the importance of social media in enhancing riotous behaviour, as well as the contribution of human nature: feeling more comfortable and secure to express any socio-economic or political views or emotions online. They also conclude that sentiment analysis and opinion mining are plausible tools for predicting future unrest and finding ways to de-escalate the situation.

Alikhani (2014) used a more traditional source of information – news outlets, to create a predicting model of civil unrest. They analyzed news stories starting with 1979, hypothesizing that a negative tone, especially targeting main political personas or international relations, could lead to political instability and, eventually, civil unrest. Their model uses the tone and frequency of news reports and has successfully predicted social unrest events with a success rate of 70-80% looking 3 months ahead (Alikhani, 2014).

Social media platform X, previously known as Twitter, has been very popular for positioning itself as a platform that encourages freedom of speech. The majority of literature on the subject has used X as their main source of information and has used different methods of predicting unrest using textual analysis. Bahrami et al. (2018) found that hashtag analysis of an ongoing online movement extracted from X can accurately predict at least 75% of protests that are bound to happen in the future. Xu et al. (2014) expand on the idea and use another platform Tumblr for estimating probabilities of unrest.

Their prediction model accurately computes the likelihood, time and location of future civil unrest episodes.

More closely related to our study is a branch of literature that investigates the potential causes of civil unrest. There could be many different reasons that cause the general public to engage in civil unrest, i.e. the political and socio-economic environment in a country, a one-time event such as police brutality, etc. Predictors analysed in previous literature can be grouped into the following categories: socio-economic and political factors.

Existing literature suggests that socio-economic factors, such as welfare, poverty and unemployment rates tend to be among the best predictors of future civil unrest episodes. Yang et al. (2019) analyzed the probability of future unrest in China relying on measures of income inequality (such as the Gini index). They found statistically significant evidence that an increase in the Gini index by 1% leads to an increase of the unrest probability by 0.442% in China. Bulutgil and Prasad (2022) expanded the research by checking how the intragroup or between-group income inequality levels affect the likelihood of future unrest based on ethno-religious groups in India. They found that ethno-religious protests, or even riots, are statistically more likely to happen if within-group inequality increases and if between-group income inequality diminishes.

Another predictor of unrest is food prices. Weinberg and Bakker (2014) found a positive relationship between rising food prices and the outbreaks of civil unrest events. Berazneva and Lee (2011) have analysed the same relationship in the context of the food riots in different countries in Africa in 2007-2008. Apart from similar conclusions as Weinberg and Bakker (2014), they found empirical evidence that limited access to food and oppressive political regimes are also significant predictors of civil unrest.

There is also empirical evidence that GDP per capita is a robust predictor of civil unrest. For example, Bilyuga et al. (2016) find that on a global scale, for the period 1960-2014, countries with higher GDP per capita growth tend to be less prone to sociopolitical destabilization.

Myers (1997) analysed how an extensive set of social, demographic, political, and economic factors affect the likelihood of civil unrest. Among the economic factors, income, education and unemployment rates are shown to be important. Focusing on the latter, he found a significant positive relation between the level of unemployment and riot risk in the context of the riots in the USA in the 1960s.

The second group of predictors are the political factors. For example, Abi-Nassif et al. (2020) found empirical evidence that negative perception of the citizens regarding the current political standing and government of a country increases the probability of civil unrest. Klein (2012) states that the general public has a higher propensity to protest when they feel that social order is not followed accordingly and their demands are not heard. Another factor to be considered when computing the likelihood of unrest is the timing of elections. Bulutgil and Prasad (2022) found that civil unrest episodes are more likely to appear in election years. Moreover, they add the prerequisite that the voting usually relates to the highest level of power, i.e. parliament, president, senate, etc. They also determined that such episodes are more likely to occur before the elections, rather than after.

Governance quality has rarely been researched in the context of being a cause of civil unrest. One exception is a study by Venger and Miethe (2017) who analyzed whether Kaufmann and Kraay's (1999) World Governance Indicators (WGIs) along with the Fragile States Index, introduced by the Fund for Peace, can be used as predictors for future revolutionary events. Using a sample of 26 countries that have experienced such revolutions in the last 2 decades, they concluded that changes in WGIs can predict the time of such a major type of civil disorder.

Governance quality is important for the prosperous growth of nations. A democratic and just system is more open to new development prospects and pays more attention to the welfare of the citizens and hearing their concerns (The World Bank, n.d.).

Kaufmann and Kraay (1999) have compiled 6 indicators, each constructed based on surveys, and information provided by non-profit organizations and private firms, thus, compiling together the opinion of the general public and experts on several elements of governance quality. These indicators are: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. These indicators have been widely used in the previous literature as proxies of governance quality.

Previous studies have shown that countries with better governance quality tend to show better economic outcomes. Zubair and Khan (2014) found that countries with better WGIs values (particularly in Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism dimensions) experience faster GDP growth. Gani (2011) provides empirical evidence that Government Effectiveness is positively and statistically significantly related to GDP

growth for developed economies. Similarly, Han et al. (2014) show that all the WGIs affect the GDP per capita growth positively.[2]

Given the positive effect of the WGIs on economic outcomes, we postulate that higher levels of governance quality are associated with reduced risk of civil unrest episodes. Hence our hypotheses are as follows:

H₁: World Government Indicators negatively affect the probability of civil unrest.

H2: World Government Indicators negatively affect the probability of violent civil unrest.

H3: World Government Indicators negatively affect the probability of significant episodes of civil unrest.

3. Data

Our sample primarily relies on the Mass Mobilization Data (MMD) compiled by Clark and Regan (2016). The MMD dataset identifies civil unrest episodes which are directed at the government in which at least fifty people have participated. For each observation, we have information on location, number of participants, the demand of protesters, the first and consecutive response from the government, the display of protestors' violence, and what were the repercussions of the civil unrest events. The dataset covers 166 countries over the period from 1990 to 2020.

We also rely on the World Bank: Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) database. The WGI database provides country-level estimates of the following indicators: Government Effectiveness, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism (hereinafter referred to as Political Stability), Regulatory Quality, Voice and Accountability, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. *Appendix A* includes the definitions of the aforementioned indicators as presented by Kaufmann and Kraay (1999) on The World Bank website. All of the indicators are measured on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5, with greater values indicating better performance.

To comply with the definition of civil unrest by Kalyvas (2000), we compile information on armed conflicts and filter out observations that happened in years and countries at war. Data on armed conflicts is gathered from Our World in Data (2023)

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[2] There is evidence that WGI matters also for stock market outcomes introduced by Imran et al. (2020).

(adapted from Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2023) and Natural Earth (2022)), which has information on conflicts from 1989 to 2022.

Additionally, we add information on several economic variables that previous literature has identified as potential determinants of civil unrest. Gini index, inflation, GDP per capita growth, unemployment rates in each country and year where the information is available. The information on these variables is gathered from the World Bank: World Development Indicators (WDI) database (n.d.) for the period 1990-2020. The descriptive statistics for these indicators can be found in Appendix B, Table 1 (the same statistics can be found for the subsamples in Appendix B, Tables 2-4). Previous literature has also identified elections as potential determinants of civil unrest, we add information on parliamentary elections gathered from the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (n.d.) and the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan (n.d.). The combined datasets have information on elections and election types from 1990 – 2020.

We add information on the country's level of economic development, type of political regime, and geographical location (continents). We split countries into Advanced and Emerging and Developing economies based on the IMF World Economic Outlook definitions (IMF, 2023). Countries classified as G7 in IMF definitions are classified as advanced economies in our dataset due to the small sample size. Information on political regime types is gathered from Economist Intelligence Unit: Democracy Index (2023). It classifies the regimes into four types: authoritarian, flawed democracy, full democracy and hybrid regime. For the purpose of our study, we have classified hybrid regimes as flawed democracies, since they have a big share of affinities.

3.1 Stylized facts

A single yearly observation is created for each country. We introduce a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if at least one episode of civil unrest did occur in the year for a given country. The civil unrest in the MDD dataset encompasses any civil unrest event that is targeted at a government or government policy and has at least 50 people involved. The final sample consists of a total of 3535 observations for the period from 1990 to 2020 partially covering 152 countries. Our sample is an unbalanced panel due to the missing of records (develpoment indicators, governance indicators, or protest data) for different countries over the years.

We further distinguish between violent and non-violent years. The protester violence in the MDD dataset includes any type of violent behaviour towards the government, which means that different categories of violence can be attributed. In the same way, a dummy variable is introduced which takes value 1 if at least one episode of protester violence is observed in a year for a given country.

On average a country experiences 3.1 episodes of unrest each year. Less than 21.7% of countries on average experience less than 1 episode of unrest every year. 36.7% of countries on average experience more than 3.1 episodes of unrest each year. Over our sample period, the share of countries which experience episodes of unrest each year has increased regardless of the level of economic development (Figure 1).

Violent episodes are far less prevalent in both emerging and advanced economies. Approximately 35%-40% of emerging economies and 25% of advanced economies experience violent episode of civil unrest each year. A similar analysis has been performed for the remaining subsamples: geographic and political regime. From Figure 1, *Appendix C*, it can be seen that on average 70% of the flawed economies experience civil unrest episodes yearly, while for authoritarian countries the peak protest time was 2010-2014 (the same time that the Arab Spring movement has emerged). With regrds to violent civil unrest (Figure 2, *Appendix C*), flawed democracies and authoritarian regimes, around 40% of each experienced violent civil unrest in 2010-2014 especially, following a downwards trend from then on. To check geographic trends, please refer to *Appendix C*, Figures 3 and 4.

Figure 1. The average share of countries experiencing an episode of civil unrest (left-hand pane) and violent unrest (right-hand pane) by years.

Note: The share of countries was calculated for each year out of the given group and the average for the five-year (six years for 15 – 20) period taken.

Source: Figure created by the authors

Figure 2. Histogram of the average share of the population involved in an episode of unrest for a given year

Source: Figure created by the authors

Some episodes of unrest are more significant than others. The vast majority of unrest episodes in our sample are relatively minor. The median share of the average population for a single-year observation of unrest is just 0.0010% (see Figure 2). Approximately 900 of these observations on average involve more than 0.025% of a country's population, which we consider significant episodes of unrest.

4. Methodology

We start by assessing whether the World Governance indicators (WGI) affect the likelihood of occurrence of any type of civil unrest. This is achieved by employing a linear probability model (equation 1). We use the linear probability model, as our dependent variables are binary (the outcome is either 0 or 1).[3]

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 G_{jit-1} + \beta_6 Z_{ijt-1} + \alpha_i + \gamma_t + u_{it} \qquad (1)$$

Where Y_{it} is a binary variable taking the value 1 if an episode of unrest occurred in country i at year t (0 otherwise). G_{jit-1} is the lagged value of a WGI indicator j. Z_{ijt} is the vector of control variables which includes Gini index, GDP per capita growth,

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[3] Moreover, following the assumptions mentioned by Vele (2019), we motivate our choice by analysing the data set and concluding that our independent variables have a linear relationship with the dependent variable (Yit).

inflation and unemployment rate. a_i and γ_t are country and year fixed effects and u_{it} is the residual.

Keeping the same setting we change our dependent variable. We distinguish between non-violent and violent episodes (2) as well as significant and insignificant episodes of unrest and use created variables as our dependent variables.

$$Y_{it}^v = \beta_0 + \beta_1 G_{jit-1} + \beta_2 Z_{ijt-1} + \alpha_i + \gamma_t + u_{it} \qquad (2)$$

$$Y_{it}^s = \beta_0 + \beta_1 G_{jit-1} + \beta_2 Z_{ijt-1} + \alpha_i + \gamma_t + u_{it} \qquad (3)$$

Where Y_{it}^v is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if violent unrest took place in country i, year t. Y_{it}^s is a dummy variable taking value 1 if a significant episode of unrest took place in country i, year t. An episode is considered to be significant if at least 0.025% of countries population participated in it.

We start by testing each WGI indicator separately in the global sample for all three specifications and then add the control variables one by one. We use one period lag for both the governance indicator and control variables to avoid the issue of reverse causality.

In the same manner, we test the WGI indicator on several subsamples, namely continental subsamples, subsamples based on economic development and subsamples based on prevailing political regime.

To test the robustness of our results we split our main sample into two periods before 2009 and after 2009, to check whether the results were persistent over the two time periods.

5. Analysis of results

5.1. Global sample

The results of our baseline regressions using the global data sample are summarized in *Table 1*. Each indicator, listed in column *WGI*, was analyzed through seven different regressions containing several control variables, added one by one, and identified as predictors of unrest in the previous literature (columns *1-7*). The table contains the estimated coefficients on how each WGI affects the dependent variable – the occurrence of unrest. For the global sample, we find significant and robust results for 3 indicators: Control of Corruption, Political Stability and Voice and Accountability.

Table 1. Estimated coefficients for the WGI from the LPM regressions (civil unrest)

WGI	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Government Effectiveness	-0.033	-0.036	0.041	-0.024	-0.027	-0.034	0.037
Control of Corruption	-0.088**	-0.098**	-0.062	-0.076	-0.080*	-0.088**	-0.067
Political Stability	-0.107***	-0.095***	-0.012	-0.089**	-0.102***	-0.107***	-0.024
Regulatory Quality	-0.044	-0.038	-0.072	-0.025	-0.038	-0.045	-0.087
Rule of Law	-0.015	-0.027	-0.030	-0.021	-0.008	-0.015	-0.015
Voice and Accountability	-0.100**	-0.105**	-0.181**	-0.130**	-0.107**	-0.099**	-0.335***

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Dependent variable: civil unrest. *(1)* Regression with only the WGI (World Governance Indicator). *(2)* Regression with the WGI and inflation as control. *(3)* Regression with the WGI and Gini index as control. *(4)* Regression with the WGI and unemployment rate as control. *(5)* Regression with the WGI and GDP per capita growth as control. *(6)* Regression with the WGI and election dummy as control. *(7)* Regression with the WGI and all control variables. *Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.*
Source: Table created by the authors

Control of Corruption shows significance at 5% and 10% when it is regressed either by itself or with inflation, GDP per capita growth, and elections as controls. All the estimated coefficients display a negative relationship with the dependent variable and range between -0.80 and -0.98, implying that a 1-unit increase in the indicator's value leads to an 8-10 p.p. decrease in the probability of civil unrest. Political Stability has more robust results and displays significance in more specifications of our baseline regression. Additionally, the magnitude of the coefficient is slightly higher than for Control of Corruption. Whenever Political stability increases by 1 point, the likelihood of unrest drops by 9-11 p.p. Voice and Accountability is significant for all the specifications analysed. The estimated coefficient oscillates between -0.099 and -0.335, suggesting that an improvement in the indicator by 1 point leads to a decrease in the probability of civil unrest by 10-33 p.p.

As for the control variables, most of the obtained coefficients are aligned with the previous literature (e.g. Yang et al., 2019). GDP per capita growth indicates a negative relationship, suggesting that richer countries are less prone to civil unrest. The estimated coefficient for the Gini index is significant and positive, meaning that an increase in the index by 1 unit leads to a boost of 1 p.p. on average for the probability of occurrence of unrest. More details on the regressions can be found in *Appendix C*.

Next, using the same sample and econometrical model, we check how the WGIs affect the likelihood of violent episodes of civil disorder. The summary of estimated coefficients is presented in *Table 2*. The table follows the same structure as the previous one – it contains the coefficients of 7 different regressions both with and without controls. In this case, the estimated coefficient for Political Stability is robust over all the specifications. The magnitude of the estimated coefficient varies between -0.073 and -0.121, implying that with an increase in the indicator by 1 point, the likelihood of violent civil unrest goes down by 7-12, p.p..

Table 2. Estimated coefficients for the WGI from the LPM regressions (violent civil unrest)

WGI	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Government Effectiveness	0.0003	-0.015	0.167**	0.053	0.001	0.0003	0.150**
Control of Corruption	-0.038	-0.049	0.038	0.038	-0.031	-0.038	0.041
Political Stability	-0.084***	-0.073**	-0.121**	-0.100**	-0.081***	-0.084***	-0.118**
Regulatory Quality	0.034	0.015	0.073	0.075	0.030	0.034	0.065
Rule of Law	0.068	0.057	0.189**	0.095	0.073	0.068	0.170*
Voice and Accountability	-0.053	-0.058	0.012	-0.022	-0.051	-0.053	-0.170*

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Dependent variable: violent civil unrest. *(1)* Regression with only the WGI (World Governance Indicator). *(2)* Regression with the WGI and inflation as control. *(3)* Regression with the WGI and Gini index as control. *(4)* Regression with the WGI and unemployment rate as control. *(5)* Regression with the WGI and GDP per capita growth as control. *(6)* Regression with the WGI and election dummy as control. *(7)* Regression with the WGI and all control variables. *Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.*
Source: Table created by the authors

Government Effectiveness and Rule of Law are presenting slightly less robust results. Strangely enough, the effect of these 2 indicators is positive. If Government Effectiveness (Rule of Law) increases by 1 unit, the probability of violent unrest happening in the next year rises by 15-16 p.p. (17-19 p.p.). Voice and Accountability is significant at 10% only for 1 of the specifications and a 1-unit improvement translates into a decrease of the probability of violence by 17 p.p.

Regarding the controls, GDP per capita growth lag displays 1% significance for all the cases with a rather small effect (-0.005), which goes hand-in-hand with the conclusions made by Bilyuga et al. (2016). The unemployment rate is also significant at either 5% or 10% and positively affects the likelihood of violent civil unrest. *Appendix D* contains more information on the regressions and details of the statistical model.

As can be seen in *Figure 2*, the majority of the unrest episodes recorded in our data set are relatively minor in terms of the share of the population participating. Thus, next, we check how the WGIs affect the occurrence of significant episodes of civil unrest. We define an episode of civil unrest as being significant if more than 0.025% of the country's population takes part in it and use it as a dependent variable in the same econometrical model as before. The results of the baseline global sample are shown in Table 3.

Unlike the results discussed above, none of the governance indicators show any significance in relation to the occurrence of significant episodes of civil unrest. From the controls, only the Parliamentary Election control is significant (at 10%), suggesting that significant episodes of civil unrest are less likely to happen in a year when parliamentary elections take place. For more information, *Appendix E* can be found at the end.

Table 3. Estimated coefficients for the WGI from the LPM regressions with the (significant civil unrest)

WGI	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Government Effectiveness	0.009	0.009	0.032	0.023	0.009	0.008	0.045
Control of Corruption	0.010	0.009	0.040	0.007	0.012	0.010	0.042
Political Stability	-0.008	-0.010	-0.037	-0.029	-0.006	-0.008	-0.060
Regulatory Quality	0.013	0.011	0.032	0.025	0.014	0.013	0.027
Rule of Law	-0.002	-0.006	0.020	-0.004	-0.002	-0.001	0.008
Voice and Accountability	-0.019	-0.027	-0.029	-0.048	-0.019	-0.019	-0.044

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Dependent variable: significant civil unrest. *(1)* Regression with only the WGI (World Governance Indicator). *(2)* Regression with the WGI and inflation as control. *(3)* Regression with the WGI and Gini index as control. *(4)* Regression with the WGI and unemployment rate as control. *(5)* Regression with the WGI and GDP per capita growth as control. *(6)* Regression with the WGI and election dummy as control. *(7)* Regression with the WGI and all control variables. *Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.*

5.2. Subsamples: economic development

Next, to see whether the results vary with different levels of economic development, we split the sample into (1) Advanced economies and (2) Emerging and Developing economies, based on IMF's classification.

Table 4 presents the estimated coefficients on how the WGI affect the occurrence of civil unrest for Advanced economies (upper pane) and Emerging and Developing economies (lower pane). For Advanced economies, Voice and Accountability is significant at 1% for all the specifications, similar to the global sample, but with a significantly higher effect. The estimated coefficients range between -0.690 to -0.777,

suggesting that a 1-unit improvement of the indicator, leads to a decrease of 69-77 p.p. of the probability of civil unrest occurring in the next year. In contrast, for Emerging and Developing economies, lagged Political Stability presents the most robust results in 4 out of 7 cases, indicating that whenever it increases by 1 point, it reduces the likelihood of civil unrest happening in the next year by 8-10 p.p. Control of Corruption, Government Effectiveness and Voice and Accountability are also significant but less robust.

In the case of Advanced Economies, inflation as a control is also statistically significant and positively affects the likelihood of civil unrest episodes. *Appendix F* can be checked for more information on all the specifications analysed.

Table 4. Estimated coefficients for the WGI from the LPM regressions (civil unrest), Advanced vs. Emerging and Developing Economies

WGI	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Advanced economies							
Government Effectiveness	-0.025	0.021	-0.033	0.036	0.005	-0.028	0.024
Control of Corruption	-0.096	-0.050	-0.037	-0.033	-0.061	-0.094	0.026
Political Stability	-0.093	-0.063	-0.136	-0.068	-0.064	-0.091	-0.085
Regulatory Quality	-0.101	-0.089	-0.111	-0.030	-0.077	-0.101	-0.115
Rule of Law	-0.113	-0.080	0.029	-0.043	-0.098	-0.113	0.054
Voice and Accountability	-0.698***	-0.690***	-0.726***	-0.684***	-0.699***	-0.697***	-0.777***
Emerging and Developing Economies							
Government Effectiveness	-0.037	-0.031	0.163*	-0.007	-0.032	-0.037	0.216*
Control of Corruption	-0.080*	-0.098*	-0.029	-0.041	-0.073	-0.080*	-0.038
Political Stability	-0.100***	-0.084**	0.064	-0.065	-0.099***	-0.100***	0.053
Regulatory Quality	-0.050	-0.042	-0.038	-0.008	-0.042	-0.049	-0.035
Rule of Law	-0.025	-0.011	-0.026	-0.018	-0.009	-0.025	0.014
Voice and Accountability	-0.059	-0.047	-0.070	-0.032	-0.063	-0.059	-0.241**

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Dependent variable: civil unrest. *(1)* Regression with only the WGI (World Governance Indicator). *(2)* Regression with the WGI and inflation as control. *(3)* Regression with the WGI and Gini index as control. *(4)* Regression with the WGI and unemployment rate as control. *(5)* Regression with the WGI and GDP per capita growth as control. *(6)* Regression with the WGI and election dummy as control. *(7)* Regression with the WGI and all control variables. *Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.*

Source: Table created by the authors

The same analysis is performed to assess the likelihood of violent civil unrest and the outcomes are presented in *Table 5*. For Advanced Economies, Political Stability is significant for all the cases we analyse. The results indicate that a 1-unit increase in the indicator leads to a 15-38 p.p. decrease in the likelihood of violent civil unrest happening in the next year. Government Effectiveness and Voice and Accountability also display some significance, which, however, is less robust. Similar to the global sample, Government Effectiveness positively affects the violent unrest episodes, increasing the likelihood by 22 p.p. Voice and Accountability, in contrast, decreases the same variable by 45 p.p.

For Emerging and Developing economies, Political Stability is also a significant indicator but is less robust. An improvement in the Political Stability indicator by 1 point, lowers the probability of violent unrest episodes by 6 p.p. Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, and Rule of Law have a significant effect on the dependent variable in one specification each, but, interestingly, the effect is positive, meaning that the probability of violence increases with an improvement in the respective WGI, by 10 p.p. (Regulatory Quality) and 21 p.p. (Government Effectiveness and Rule of Law).

For Advanced economies, the unemployment rate and GDP per capita growth are significant predictors of civil unrest when added as controls. For Emerging economies, only the latter is significant. More details can be found in *Appendix G*.

Table 5. Estimated coefficients for the WGI from the LPM regressions (violent civil unrest), Advanced vs. Emerging and Developing Economies

WGI	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Advanced economies							
Government Effectiveness	0.033	0.022	0.152	0.068	0.023	0.031	0.220*
Control of Corruption	0.037	0.013	0.027	0.075	0.022	0.038	0.120
Political Stability	-0.167**	-0.172**	-0.388***	-0.135*	-0.150**	-0.165**	-0.302***
Regulatory Quality	-0.073	-0.092	-0.156	-0.021	-0.093	-0.073	-0.074
Rule of Law	0.006	0.009	0.086	0.110	-0.006	0.007	0.212
Voice and Accountability	-0.222	-0.239	-0.449*	-0.157	-0.241	-0.221	-0.298
Emerging and Developing Economies							
Government Effectiveness	-0.015	-0.033	0.206**	0.074	-0.010	-0.015	0.186
Control of Corruption	-0.052	-0.067	0.055	0.053	-0.044	-0.051	0.036
Political Stability	-0.069**	-0.056	-0.047	-0.074	-0.068**	-0.069**	-0.059
Regulatory Quality	0.039	0.021	0.118	0.105*	0.039	0.040	0.126
Rule of Law	0.070	0.059	0.219**	0.120	0.080	0.070	0.201
Voice and Accountability	-0.048	-0.049	0.049	0.011	-0.043	-0.049	-0.170

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Dependent variable: violent civil unrest. *(1)* Regression with only the WGI (World Governance Indicator). *(2)* Regression with the WGI and inflation as control. *(3)* Regression with the WGI and Gini index as control. *(4)* Regression with the WGI and unemployment rate as control. *(5)* Regression with the WGI and GDP per capita growth as control. *(6)* Regression with the WGI and election dummy as control. *(7)* Regression with the WGI and all control variables. *Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.*
Source: Table created by the authors

The same analysis is performed for both types of economies, using only the significant episodes of civil unrest. The estimated coefficients are presented in *Table 6*. Unlike the results presented for the global sample, in the Advanced economies Political Stability and Voice and Accountability are statistically significant at 1% in most of the cases. Additionally, the latter has the highest effect on the probability of significant unrest occurring. When Political Stability (Voice and Accountability) increases by 1 unit, the likelihood of a civil unrest episode where more than 0.025% of the population participates

decreases by 16-18 p.p. (33-39 p.p.). Conversely, for Emerging and Developing economies, only Government Effectiveness is significant at 5% and it implies that for every 1-point improvement the probability of significant unrest increases by 14 p.p.

Table 6. Estimated coefficients for the WGI from the LPM regressions (significant civil unrest), Advanced vs. Emerging and Developing Economies

WGI	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Advanced economies							
Government Effectiveness	-0.021	-0.025	-0.059	-0.035	-0.023	-0.024	-0.061
Control of Corruption	0.029	0.026	0.109	0.016	0.030	0.031	0.131
Political Stability	-0.171***	-0.175***	-0.141*	-0.186***	-0.166***	-0.170***	-0.131
Regulatory Quality	-0.017	-0.017	0.035	-0.043	-0.018	-0.018	0.039
Rule of Law	-0.060	-0.062	-0.040	-0.095	-0.066	-0.059	-0.062
Voice and Accountability	-0.337***	-0.345***	-0.240	-0.394***	-0.345***	-0.336***	-0.281
Emerging and Developing Economies							
Government Effectiveness	0.012	0.013	0.067	0.038	0.013	0.012	0.143**
Control of Corruption	0.005	0.002	0.007	-0.004	0.005	0.004	0.017
Political Stability	0.010	0.010	-0.009	0.004	0.013	0.010	-0.031
Regulatory Quality	0.016	0.014	0.018	0.033	0.017	0.015	0.032
Rule of Law	0.006	0.001	0.029	0.012	0.006	0.006	0.038
Voice and Accountability	-0.005	-0.012	-0.023	-0.021	-0.005	-0.005	-0.015

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Dependent variable: significant civil unrest. *(1)* Regression with only the WGI (World Governance Indicator). *(2)* Regression with WGI and inflation as control. *(3)* Regression with the WGI and Gini index as control. *(4)* Regression with the WGI and unemployment rate as control. *(5)* Regression with the WGI and GDP per capita growth as control. *(6)* Regression with the WGI and election dummy as control. *(7)* Regression with the WGI and all control variables. *Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.*
Source: Table created by the authors

5.3. Geographical subsamples

Next, we analyze whether there is any continental heterogeneity. We split the dataset based on geographical location. *Table 7* contains information on the estimated coefficients for WGI (specification with all the controls) for the continental subsamples.

The data is divided into 5 continents: Asia, Africa, Europe, North America, and South America, each corresponding to one column. Oceania is added to Asia due to the small sample size.

Table 7. Estimated coefficients for the WGI from the LPM regressions (civil unrest) for the geographical subsamples

WGI	Asia	Africa	Europe	North America	South America
Government Effectiveness	0.033	-0.407	-0.085	0.364	0.402*
Control of Corruption	-0.046	1.503	-0.165	0.333	-0.509**
Political Stability	0.137	-1.109	-0.052	-0.385	-0.038
Regulatory Quality	-0.054	-0.141	-0.142	0.292	-0.129
Rule of Law	-0.087	0.377	-0.019	0.337	-0.024
Voice and Accountability	-0.098	-1.210	-0.503***	-0.817*	-0.552

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Dependent variable: civil unrest. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. *Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.*
Source: Table created by the authors

The estimated coefficients vary quite a bit. None of the indicators are significant for Asia and Africa. For other continents, only a few indicators display significance. The most robust result is recorded for Europe – Political stability decreases the probability of civil unrest in the next year by 50 p.p. This result goes hand-in-hand with our findings for the global sample and the Advanced economies sample, as Europe has the highest share of advanced countries. For North America, the same indicator is significant, but less robust, indicating that a 1-unit increase leads to an 82 p.p. decrease in the probability of civil unrest. In South America, both Government Effectiveness and Control of Corruption are significant and lead to an increase (decrease) of 40 p.p. (50 p.p.) in the probability of civil unrest happening next year. From the controls, only parliamentary elections are statistically significant and negatively affect civil unrest in Latin America (see *Appendix I*).

Next, we use the same specifications to understand the effect of the WGIs on the probability of violent civil unrest (Table 8). The only significant results are recorded for Asia and North America. An increase of 1 unit in Rule of Law in Asia leads to an increase of 38 p.p. for the likelihood of violent civil unrest. In North America, Political Stability

and Voice and accountability negatively affect violent unrest episodes by 63 p.p. and, correspondingly, 109 p.p.

The Gini index and unemployment rate as controls are highly significant for the European sample in depicting the probability of violent unrest, displaying a negative, and, respectively, positive effect. The size of these effects can be seen in *Appendix J*.

Table 8. Estimated coefficients for the WGI from the LPM regressions (violent civil unrest) for the geographical subsamples

WGI	Asia	Africa	Europe	North America	South America
Government Effectiveness	0.357	-0.520	0.057	0.279	0.249
Control of Corruption	-0.111	1.796	0.011	0.526	0.188
Political Stability	0.046	-1.290	-0.106	-0.630**	-0.122
Regulatory Quality	0.227	-0.197	-0.009	-0.409	-0.033
Rule of Law	0.387*	0.506	0.125	-0.016	0.245
Voice and Accountability	-0.303	-1.434	-0.034	-1.095**	-0.686

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Dependent variable: violent civil unrest. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. *Country and time Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.*
Source: Table created by the authors

Next, we check the effect of the WGIs on the probability of significant civil unrest occurring (>0.025% of the population participates) using the continental subsamples. The results are shown in *Table 9*. None of the WGIs are showing any significance in this case (see *Appendix K* for all results).

Table 9. Estimated coefficients for the WGI from the LPM (significant civil unrest) for the geographical subsamples

WGI	Asia	Africa	Europe	North America	South America
Government Effectiveness	0.049	-1.256	0.031	0.063	0.020
Control of Corruption	-0.087	0.999	0.094	-0.057	0.052
Political Stability	-0.044	0.259	-0.053	-0.223	-0.048
Regulatory Quality	-0.030	-0.926	0.027	0.251	-0.034
Rule of Law	-0.114	1.856	-0.018	-0.222	0.003
Voice and Accountability	-0.024	-0.492	-0.090	-0.005	0.074

5.4. Political regime subsamples

From our previous analysis, we see that for the Advanced economies, WGIs tend to be more useful in explaining the occurrence of civil unrest. Similarly, for the countries in Europe and North America, these indicators seem to matter more. This might suggest that the quality of governance might matter more for the democracies. Thus, we extend our analysis and check how these indicators affect civil unrest in different types of political regimes. Using Economist Intelligence Unit's report for Democracy index, we divide our sample into 3 categories: authoritarian, flawed democracies, and full democracies. We perform the same analysis on the 3 dependent variables: (1) the probability of civil unrest; (2) the probability of violent unrest episodes; and (3) the probability of significant episodes of civil unrest.

Table 10 contains the estimated coefficients when the dependent variable includes all episodes of civil unrest. We use linear probability model and run regressions that contain all the controls together with the respective WGI. For each of the regime types, there is only one indicator that can be used to predict civil unrest events. In Full democracies, a 1-unit increase in Political Stability leads to a decrease of 20 p.p. in the likelihood of unrest events. For Flawed Democracies, Voice and Accountability shows more robust results and implies that by improving the indicator by 1 point, the probability of unrest drops by 32 p.p. For Authoritarian regimes, Control of Corruption is significant at 5%. Whenever the indicator rises by 1 unit, the likelihood of an unrest event in *t* is reduced by 102 p.p. Additionally, for Full democracies, lagged Gini and Inflation display statistical significance and both of these controls positively affect the dependent variable, meaning that if either of them increases, more civil unrest is likely to follow in the next year (see *Appendix L*).

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Table 10. Estimated coefficients for the WGI from the LPM regressions (civil unrest) for political regime types

WGI	Full Democracy	Flawed Democracy	Authoritarian
Government Effectiveness	0.050	0.098	-0.253
Control of Corruption	0.029	0.020	-1.025**
Political Stability	-0.205*	-0.059	0.195
Regulatory Quality	-0.160	-0.064	-0.306
Rule of Law	-0.014	0.055	-0.407
Voice and Accountability	-0.286	-0.319**	0.247

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Dependent variable: civil unrest. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. *Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.*
Source: Table created by the authors

Next, we turn to violent civil unrest episodes. For all types of regimes, Political Stability is significant at 5% or 10%. In both types of democracies, the effect is negative, implying that an improvement of 1 unit leads to a decrease of 27 p.p. (full) and 16 p.p. (flawed) in the probability of violent civil unrest happening in the next year. These results support our findings above, showing that Political Stability matters in depicting the probability of violent civil unrest events. Interestingly, in Authoritarian regimes, the same estimated coefficient is positive, meaning that an increase in the indicator by 1 point, leads to an increase in the likelihood of violent unrest by 44 p.p. For flawed democracies also Rule of Law displays a significant coefficient. (see Appendix M for the full set of results).

Table 11. Estimated coefficients for the WGI from the LPM regressions (violent civil unrest) for political regime types

WGI	Full Democracy	Flawed Democracy	Authoritarian
Government Effectiveness	0.111	0.162	-0.036
Control of Corruption	-0.094	0.118	-0.581
Political Stability	-0.276**	-0.161*	0.445**
Regulatory Quality	-0.056	0.084	-0.036
Rule of Law	-0.068	0.222*	0.188
Voice and Accountability	-0.376	-0.200	0.049

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Dependent variable: violent civil unrest. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. *Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.*
Source: Table created by the authors

Next, we check the effect of the WGIs on the probability of significant civil unrest occurring in different political regime types. The results are shown in *Table 12*. There were no significant unrest events in Authoritarian countries, which can be explained by the government's oppression towards protestors. For both types of democracies none of the indicators, as well as none of the controls, exhibit a statistically significant relation to the occurrence of significant unrest episodes.

Table 12. Estimated coefficients for the WGI from the LPM (significant civil unrest) for political regime types

WGI	Full Democracy	Flawed Democracy	Authoritarian
Government Effectiveness	0.061	0.055	
Control of Corruption	0.102	0.036	
Political Stability	-0.128	-0.070	
Regulatory Quality	0.048	0.027	
Rule of Law	-0.063	0.013	
Voice and Accountability	-0.076	-0.045	

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Dependent variable: significant civil unrest. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. *Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.*
Source: Table created by the authors

5.5. Robustness results

To evaluate the sensitivity of our results described above, we do a robustness check and divide our sample period into 2 subsamples. The first subsample is for the period 1998 – 2009, and the second is from 2010-2020 (included). This division is also relevant since it divides the sample into the time before and during the 2007-2008 financial crisis and after it.

The results are displayed in *Table 13*. As in the baseline results, Voice and Accountability is the most robust indicator, showing that a 1-unit increase leads to a 43-52 p.p. decrease in the probability of civil unrest. Additionally, we can see that our results for the global sample for Political Stability have been drawn by the period before and during the financial crisis, decreasing the likelihood of unrest events by 33 p.p. Government Effectiveness exhibits the same positive relationship as in our baseline regressions.

Table 13. Estimated coefficients for the WGI from the LPM regressions for the robustness subsamples

WGI	Civil Unrest		Violent Civil Unrest		Significant Civil Unrest	
	1998-2009	*2010-2020*	*1998-2009*	*2010-2020*	*1998-2009*	*2010-2020*
Government Effectiveness	-0.014	0.217*	0.328*	0.240**	0.024	0.073
Control of Corruption	-0.145	0.032	0.111	0.137	-0.075	0.063
Political Stability	-0.333***	-0.020	-0.297**	-0.100	-0.218***	0.012
Regulatory Quality	-0.051	0.063	0.348**	0.023	-0.066	0.006
Rule of Law	-0.234	0.122	0.127	0.274*	-0.241*	-0.057
Voice and Accountability	-0.431***	-0.524***	-0.137	-0.279	-0.062	-0.199*

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Dependent variables (in order): civil unrest, violent civil unrest, significant civil unrest. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. *Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.*
Source: Table created by the authors

Political Stability, Rule of Law, and Government Effectiveness are significant predictors of violent civil unrest. All the estimated coefficients are similar to the results for the baseline specification. Except for Government Effectiveness, it can be seen that the global results are driven by one of the two periods. Here we see that Regulatory Quality can also drive violent unrest episodes, but mostly for the pre-2009 period. In this case, the effect is positive, indicating that a 1-point increase in this indicator boosts the probability of violent unrest by 34 p.p.

Unlike in the full sample, some of the WGIs can be used as predictors of significant unrest in the subsamples. Political Stability and Rule of Law showed a negative relation to the significant episodes of civil unrest before the global financial crisis, but not afterwards. In turn, Voice and Accountability displays a negative association with the occurrence of significant episodes of civil unrest only after the crisis. (see *Appendix O* for more information).

6. Discussion

To answer our research question "*How does governance quality affect the probability of civil unrest?*", we employ the linear probability model and use data from

the Mass Mobilization Data (MMD) by Clark & Regan (2016) and WGIs (Kaufmann & Kraay, 1999) and control variables, i.e. inflation, Gini index, GDP per capita growth, unemployment rate, and parliamentary elections binary variable.

On a global scale, we find that higher levels of Political Stability, Control of Corruption and Voice and Accountability are associated with a lower probability of civil unrest. Furthermore, improving Political Stability can also lower the probability of violent civil unrest. Our findings indicate that the general public, as well as experts value freedom of speech and media, a stable political environment and the transparency and integrity of government institutions and their agents. Any breach of the principles mentioned above incentivizes people to participate in unrest events.

Apart from a steady political situation, for citizens, legal principles and their obedience, as well as public services' quality is an important factor when considering applying violence in a civil unrest event. There are however certain limits to which governance quality can explain the occurrence of civil unrest. Most of the episodes are rather minor and only few can be considered significant. We defined significant episodes as those in which 0.025% of the country's population participates but found no evidence that the WGIs could be used as predictors of such events.

We next split the global sample into several subsamples depending on economic development, geographic location and political regime to check how the WGIs affect civil unrest in countries with different characteristics. We found robust evidence that for Advanced economies Voice and Accountability is the only indicator that could be used to predict civil unrest. For Emerging and Developing countries, in contrast, Political Stability is the one that matters the most. This indicates that in more developed countries, a breach of freedom of speech and media could lead to civil unrest, while in emerging ones, the perception of an unsafe political arena matters the most. With regards to violent civil disorder, for both Advanced and Emerging and Developing economies, Political Stability presents robust results. The findings described above point out that the World Governance Indicators start to matter more for countries (economies) that are categorised as Advanced. They also indicate that people living at or below the subsistence level might not have enough time to go out and protest or engage in other types of civil unrest.

For the geographical subsample, we find that in Europe and North America, Voice and Accountability is the only indicator that can be used as a predictor of civil unrest. Violent unrest can be predicted by dropping values of Political Stability and Voice and Accountability only in North America. These results go hand in hand with what we

previously discussed, as the continents (Europe and North America) where these indicators matter, also have the highest share of Advanced economies. Concerning political regimes, when computing the likelihood of violent unrest, one should take into account the following indicators: Political Stability in Full Democracies, Voice and Accountability in Flawed Democracies, and Control of Corruption in Authoritarian countries. These results show the nature of the problems that people care about in different political settings, such as freedom of speech and media, transparency objectivity towards all and equal measures. We also find that Political Stability matters in all regime types and can be used as a predictor when computing the probability of violent civil unrest.

Compared to Venger and Miethe (2017), we provide new empirical evidence that relates to several dimensions of civil unrest apart from the general definition, i.e. violent and significant. We show that several WGIs can be used to compute the likelyhood of all types of social disorder, not only revolutionary episodes (riots that lead to an overturn of a government). These indicators are: Political Stability, Control of Corruption and Voice and Accountability. Other scholars (Abi-Nassif et al. (2020), Klein (2012)) have also focused on the importance of governance to predict extreme situations, e.g. civil wars. Although their mentions of governance as indicators were brief, they support our findings. Abi-Nassif et al. (2020) reveal that the current political standing of a coutry is an important factor that the population considers when choosing whether to protest or not. This aligns with our conclusions that Political stability could further be used in predictive models. Klein (2012) affirms that the general public is willing to protest more when they do not feel heard, which goes in line with our conclusion that Voica and Accountability matters when computing the likelihood of civil unrest.

This study, however, is limited by several factors. First, while the MMD dataset contains information on episodes from 1990 to 2020, the WGI dataset is available only starting from 1996, trends that occur within the time gap won't be captured. Second, due to our approach of calculating significant episodes of unrest divided by the total population of a country, we omit some episodes where an episode would be considered significant relative to the regional population. Third, the study does not account for the protesters' demands, and the reasoning behind the protest, as it is likely that for some types of protests, the indicators have varying effects. Fourth, the study does not consider protests in neighbouring countries as there could be spillover effects. The mentioned limitations could be considered in further studies to draw more conclusions on the topic.

With this study, we aim to show whether the WGIs affect the occurrence of civil unrest episodes. Our findings support the conclusions of Venger and Miethe (2017) and also provide new evidence that when computing the probability of more types of civil unrest globally, Political Stability and Voice and Accountability, and Control of Corruption are robust factors. Our *H1* is partially supported by the results as only 3 out of 6 indicators display statistical significance. With regard to *H2*, we conclude that Political Stability is associated with lower probabilities of violent episodes of civil unrest. *H3* is not supported by our results globally as no indicators have any relation to the prevalence of significant unrest events but we see that for Advanced economies both Political Stability and Voice and Accountability matter more. Our results point towards the fact that from all the indicators, Political Stability and Voice and Accountability matter the most for predicting civil unrest, and the effect increases when a country reaches a certain level of development.

7. Conclusion

Civil unrest events have always been a way for society to show their disagreement towards a country's government or other aspects such as poor quality of life, new laws and policies, etc. As the consequences of any occurrence of this sort can leave a detrimental mark on a country's economy and socio-political environment, it is important to understand what factors cause these events. This research contributes to the existing literature on factors affecting civil unrest by providing empirical evidence that several aspects of governance quality also should be taken into account. We contribute by checking how governance quality affects the probability of civil unrest globally and based on different attributes: (1) economic development, (2) geographical location, and (3) regime types. Additionally, we use Kaufmann and Kraay's (1999) World Governance Indicators as measures of governance quality, as they bring together both experts and the general public's opinions on several governance aspects: Government Effectiveness, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Regulatory Quality, Voice and Accountability, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption.

We find empirical evidence that globally, Political Stability, Voice and Accountability, and Control of Corruption negatively affect the probability of civil unrest events and could be further used as additions to predictive models. We then show that

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these indicators have a more pronounced effect on our dependent variables and follow the same negative trend in Advanced economies. Our findings point towards the fact that the more advanced a country becomes, the more the WGIs start to matter. In geographical subsamples, we show that the same indicators are robust predictors in Europe and North America, where the share of advanced economies is higher. The 3 indicators mentioned above also affect the probability of civil unrest when we divide or sample by political regime types but in this case, each corresponds with a type, i.e. Political Stability matters in Full Democracies, Voice and Accountability in Flawed Democracies and Control of Corruption in Authoritarian countries.

Our results indicate that Political Stability and Voice and Accountability are robust predictors of civil unrest and different aspects of it. We also prove that the more advanced a country is economically, the more these indicators start to matter. Our findings could be used in further studies as additional factors that cause civil unrest and be added to predictive models. Moreover, our empirical evidence indicates that policymakers should pay attention to the WGI levels when deciding on improvement areas and how to lower occurrences of civil unrest.

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
9. Appendices

Appendix A. World Governance Indicators - Definitions

Indicator Name	Description	Source
Government Effectiveness	"perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies"	Kaufmann and Kraay (1999); The World Bank
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism	"perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism"	Kaufmann and Kraay (1999); The World Bank
Regulatory Quality	"perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development"	Kaufmann and Kraay (1999); The World Bank
Voice and Accountability	"perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media"	Kaufmann and Kraay (1999); The World Bank
Rule of Law	"perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence"	Kaufmann and Kraay (1999); The World Bank
Control of Corruption	"perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests"	Kaufmann and Kraay (1999); The World Bank

Source: Table created by the authors using the definitions from The World Bank.

Appendix B. Descriptive Statistics of Development & Governance Indicators

Table 1. Descriptive statistics of Dvelopment and Governance Indicators (global sample)

Variable	Mean	St dev	Availability	Source
Government Effectiveness: Estimate	-0.17	0.97	1996-2020	World Bank
Control of Corruption: Estimate	-0.21	0.97	1996-2020	World Bank
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism: Estimate	-0.24	0.96	1996-2020	World Bank
Regulatory Quality: Estimate	-0.15	0.98	1996-2020	World Bank
Rule of Law: Estimate	-0.23	0.97	1996-2020	World Bank
Voice and Accountability: Estimate	-0.22	0.99	1996-2020	World Bank
Gini index	38.00	8.98	1990-2020	World Bank
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)	30.92	420.31	1990-2020	World Bank
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	1.92	6.49	1990-2020	World Bank
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (national estimate)	8.27	6.09	1990-2020	World Bank

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 2. Descriptive statistics of Dvelopment and Governance Indicators (economic development subsample)

	Mean	
Variable	*Advanced Economies*	*Emerging Economies*
Government Effectiveness: Estimate	1,32	-0,52
Control of Corruption: Estimate	1,22	-0,55
Political Stability Estimate	0,89	-0,50
Regulatory Quality: Estimate	1,28	-0,47
Rule of Law: Estimate	1,25	-0,57
Voice and Accountability: Estimate	1,12	-0,52
Gini index	30,55	41,47
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)	10,73	36,66
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	2,24	1,92
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force)	8,01	8,50

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 3. Descriptive statistics of Dvelopment and Governance Indicators (political regime subsample)

Variable	Mean		
	Flawed Democracy	*Full Democracy*	*Authoritarian regime*
Government Effectiveness: Estimate	-0,09	1,41	-0,80
Control of Corruption: Estimate	-0,20	1,47	-0,77
Political Stability: Estimate	-0,13	0,89	-0,72
Regulatory Quality: Estimate	0,01	1,32	-0,85
Rule of Law: Estimate	-0,16	1,42	-0,86
Voice and Accountability: Estimate	0,11	1,27	-1,15
Gini index	40,61		37,12
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)	31,25	3,65	42,76
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	2,17	1,67	1,72
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force)	9,23	7,49	6,35

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 4. Descriptive statistics of Dvelopment and Governance Indicators (geographical subsample)

Variable	Mean				
	Asia	*Africa*	*Europe*	*North America*	*South America*
Government Effectiveness: Estimate	-0,20	-0,79	0,77	-0,20	-0,23
Control of Corruption: Estimate	-0,37	-0,67	0,68	-0,28	-0,24
Political Stability: Estimate	-0,45	-0,62	0,54	-0,07	-0,33
Regulatory Quality: Estimate	-0,31	-0,73	0,84	-0,06	-0,20
Rule of Law: Estimate	-0,34	-0,73	0,73	-0,41	-0,40
Voice and Accountability: Estimate	-0,72	-0,68	0,80	0,03	0,19
Gini index	35,69	43,20	31,57	47,08	49,76
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %)	16,86	42,57	27,75	8,55	67,39
GDP per capita growth (annual %)	2,64	1,31	2,18	1,36	1,78
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force)	5,72	10,71	9,81	6,85	8,01

Source: Table created by the authors

Appendix C. The average share of countries experiencing different dimensions of civil unrest by years and subsamples

Figure 1. The average share of countries experiencing an episode of civil unrest) by years and political regime

Note: The share of countries was calculated for each year out of the given group and the average for the five-year (six years for 15 – 20) period taken.
Source: Figure created by the authors

Figure 2. The average share of countries experiencing an episode of violent unrest by years and political regime

Note: The share of countries was calculated for each year out of the given group and the average for the five-year (six years 15 – 20) period taken.
Source: Figure created by the authors

Figure 3. The average share of countries experiencing an episode of civil unrest) by years and continent

Note: The share of countries was calculated for each year out of the given group and the average for the five-year (six years for 15 – 20) period taken. *Source: Figure created by the authors*

Figure 4. The average share of countries experiencing an episode of violent unrest by years and continent

Note: The share of countries was calculated for each year out of the given group and the average for the five-year (six years for 15 – 20) period taken.
Source: Figure created by the authors

Table 1. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Government Effectiveness*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
				Dependent variable:			
				Civil unrest			
Government Effectiveness Lag	−0.033	−0.036	0.041	−0.024	−0.027	−0.034	0.037
	(0.042)	(0.046)	(0.071)	(0.055)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.077)
Inflation Lag		0.0004					0.002
		(0.001)					(0.001)
Gini Lag			0.009				0.014**
			(0.005)				(0.007)
Unemployment Rate Lag				0.002			−0.001
				(0.004)			(0.005)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.004*		−0.0005
					(0.002)		(0.005)
Parliamentary Election						−0.012	−0.031
						(0.021)	(0.030)
Observations	2,570	2,355	1,145	1,727	2,496	2,570	1,022
R^2	0.0003	0.001	0.003	0.0002	0.001	0.0004	0.010
Adjusted R^2	−0.069	−0.073	−0.146	−0.100	−0.069	−0.069	−0.137
F Statistic	0.621 (df = 1; 2403)	0.563 (df = 2; 2193)	1.306 (df = 2; 996)	0.185 (df = 2; 1569)	1.656 (df = 2; 2330)	0.479 (df = 2; 2402)	1.471 (df = 6; 889)

*Note: *$p<0.1$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$*. (1) Regression with Government Effectiveness (GE) only. (2) Regression with GE and inflation as control. (3) Regression with GE and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with GE and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with GE and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with GE and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with GE and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.*

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 2. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Control of Corruption*

				Dependent variable:			
				Civil unrest			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Control of Corruption Lag	−0.088**	−0.098**	−0.062	−0.076	−0.080*	−0.088**	−0.067
	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.069)	(0.056)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.074)
Inflation Lag		0.0004					0.002
		(0.001)					(0.001)
Gini Lag			0.008				0.013**
			(0.005)				(0.006)
Unemployment Rate Lag				0.001			−0.001
				(0.004)			(0.005)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.003*		−0.001
					(0.002)		(0.005)
Parliamentary Election						−0.012	−0.031
						(0.021)	(0.030)
Observations	2,573	2,358	1,145	1,727	2,499	2,573	1,022
R^2	0.002	0.002	0.003	0.001	0.003	0.002	0.011
Adjusted R^2	−0.067	−0.071	−0.145	−0.099	−0.068	−0.067	−0.136
F Statistic	4.236** (df = 1; 2406)	2.518* (df = 2; 2193)	1.541 (df = 2; 996)	1.000 (df = 2; 1569)	3.150** (df = 2; 2333)	2.299 (df = 2; 2405)	1.575 (df = 6; 889)

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Control of Corruption (CoC) only. (2) Regression with CoC and inflation as control. (3) Regression with CoC and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with CoC and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with CoC and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with CoC and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with CoC and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.*
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 3. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Political Stability*

	Dependent variable:						
	Civil unrest						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Political Stability Lag	−0.107***	−0.095***	−0.012	−0.089**	−0.102***	−0.107***	−0.024
	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.054)	(0.041)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.060)
Inflation Lag		0.0003					0.002
		(0.001)					(0.001)
Gini Lag			0.008				0.013**
			(0.005)				(0.006)
Unemployment Rate Lag				0.001			−0.001
				(0.004)			(0.005)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.003		−0.001
					(0.002)		(0.005)
Parliamentary Election						−0.011	−0.031
						(0.021)	(0.030)
Observations	2,573	2,358	1,145	1,727	2,499	2,573	1,022
R^2	0.005	0.004	0.002	0.003	0.006	0.005	0.010
Adjusted R^2	−0.063	−0.069	−0.146	−0.097	−0.065	−0.064	−0.137
F Statistic	12.574*** (df = 1; 2406)	4.541** (df = 2; 2196)	1.164 (df = 2; 996)	2.449* (df = 2; 1569)	6.709*** (df = 2; 2333)	6.417*** (df = 2; 2405)	1.460 (df = 6; 889)

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Political Stability (PS) only. (2) Regression with PS and inflation as control. (3) Regression with PS and Gini index as control.*
(4) Regression with PS and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with PS and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with PS and election dummy as control.
(7) Regression with PS and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 4. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Regulatory Quality*

				Dependent variable:			
				Civil unrest			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Regulatory Quality Lag	−0.044	−0.038	−0.072	−0.025	−0.038	−0.045	−0.087
	(0.042)	(0.046)	(0.067)	(0.053)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.075)
Inflation Lag		0.0005					0.002
		(0.001)					(0.001)
Gini Lag			0.008				0.013**
			(0.005)				(0.006)
Unemployment Rate Lag				0.001			−0.002
				(0.004)			(0.005)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.004*		−0.002
					(0.002)		(0.005)
Parliamentary Election						−0.012	−0.032
						(0.021)	(0.030)
Observations	2,573	2,358	1,145	1,727	2,499	2,573	1,022
R^2	0.0005	0.001	0.003	0.0003	0.002	0.001	0.011
Adjusted R^2	−0.069	−0.073	−0.145	−0.100	−0.069	−0.069	−0.136
F Statistic	1.097 (df = 1; 2406)	0.600 (df = 2; 2196)	1.726 (df = 2; 996)	0.200 (df = 2; 1569)	1.890 (df = 2; 2333)	0.725 (df = 2; 2405)	1.658 (df = 6; 889)

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Regulatory Quality (RQ) only. (2) Regression with RQ and inflation as control. (3) Regression with RQ and Gini index as control.*
(4) Regression with RQ and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with RQ and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with RQ and election dummy as control.
(7) Regression with RQ and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 5. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Rule of Law*

				Dependent variable:			
				Civil unrest			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Rule of Law Lag	−0.015	−0.027	−0.030	−0.021	−0.008	−0.015	−0.015
	(0.049)	(0.054)	(0.080)	(0.065)	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.090)
Inflation Lag		0.0005					0.002
		(0.001)					(0.001)
Gini Lag			0.008				0.013**
			(0.005)				(0.006)
Unemployment Rate Lag				0.002			−0.001
				(0.004)			(0.005)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.004*		−0.001
					(0.002)		(0.005)
Parliamentary Election						−0.012	−0.031
						(0.021)	(0.030)
Observations	2,573	2,358	1,145	1,727	2,499	2,573	1,022
R2	0.00004	0.0003	0.002	0.0002	0.001	0.0002	0.010
Adjusted R^2	−0.069	−0.073	−0.146	−0.100	−0.069	−0.069	−0.137
F Statistic	0.092 (df = 1; 2406)	0.381 (df = 2; 2196)	1.213 (df = 2; 996)	0.145 (df = 2; 1569)	1.512 (df = 2; 2333)	0.207 (df = 2; 2405)	1.439 (df = 6; 889)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Rule of Law (RoL) only. (2) Regression with RoL and inflation as control. (3) Regression with RoL and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with RoL and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with RoL and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with RoL and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with RoL and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 6. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Voice and Accountability*

	Dependent variable:						
	Civil unrest						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Voice and Accountability Lag	−0.100**	−0.105**	−0.181**	−0.130**	−0.107**	−0.099**	−0.335***
	(0.047)	(0.050)	(0.088)	(0.064)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.099)
Inflation Lag		0.0005					0.002
		(0.001)					(0.001)
Gini Lag			0.008				0.012*
			(0.005)				(0.006)
Unemployment Rate Lag				0.002			−0.002
				(0.004)			(0.005)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.003*		−0.003
					(0.002)		(0.005)
Parliamentary Election						−0.011	−0.030
						(0.021)	(0.029)
Observations	2,573	2,358	1,145	1,727	2,499	2,573	1,022
R^2	0.002	0.002	0.007	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.022
Adjusted R^2	−0.067	−0.071	−0.141	−0.097	−0.067	−0.067	−0.123
F Statistic	4.464** (df = 1; 2406)	2.489* (df = 2; 2196)	3.278** (df = 2; 996)	2.126 (df = 2; 1569)	3.985** (df = 2; 2333)	2.373* (df = 2; 2405)	3.357*** (df = 6; 889)

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Voice and Accountability (VA) only. (2) Regression with VA and inflation as control. (3) Regression with VA and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with VA and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with VA and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with VA and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with VA and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.*
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 1. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Government Effectiveness*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
				Dependent variable:			
				Violent Civil unrest			
Government Effectiveness Lag	0.0003	- 0.015	0.167**	0.053	0.001	0.0003	0.150**
	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.072)	(0.052)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.076)
Inflation Lag		0.0003					0.002
		(0.001)					(0.001)
Gini Lag			0.006				0.004
			(0.005)				(0.006)
Unemployment Rate Lag				0.006*			−0.011*
				(0.004)			(0.005)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.005*		−0.010**
					(0.002)		(0.005)
Parliamentary Election						−0.002	−0.014
						(0.020)	(0.029)
Observations	2,570	2,355	1,145	1,727	2,496	2,570	1,022
R2	0.00000	0.0001	0.006	0.003	0.003	0.00000	0.021
Adjusted R^2	−0.069	−0.073	−0.142	−0.097	−0.067	−0.070	−0.124
F Statistic	0.00005 (df = 1; 2403)	0.152 (df = 2; 2193)	3.074** (df = 2; 996)	2.082 (df = 2; 1569)	3.774** (df = 2; 2330)	0.004 (df = 2; 2402)	3.233*** (df = 6; 889)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Government Effectiveness (GE) only. (2) Regression with GE and inflation as control. (3) Regression with GE and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with GE and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with GE and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with GE and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with GE and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 2. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Control of Corruption*

				Dependent variable:			
				Violent Civil unrest			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Control of Corrution Lag	−0.038	−0.049	0.038	0.038	−0.031	−0.038	0.041
	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.070)	(0.053)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.073)
Inflation Lag		0.0003					0.002
		(0.001)					(0.001)
Gini Lag			0.005				0.002
			(0.005)				(0.006)
Unemployment Rate Lag				0.006*			0.011**
				(0.004)			(0.005)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.005***		− 0.011**
					(0.002)		(0.005)
Parliamentary Election						*0.01*	−0.015
						(0.020	(0.029)
Observations	2,573	2,358	1,145	1,727	2,499	2,573	1,022
R^2	0.0003	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.004	0.0004	0.017
Adjusted R^2	−0.069	−0.073	−0.147	−0.098	−0.067	−0.069	−0.128
F Statistic	0.841 (df = 1; 2406)	0.710 (df = 2; 2196)	0.528 (df = 2; 996)	1.817 (df = 2; 1569)	4.099** (df = 2; 2333)	0.423 (df = 2; 2405)	2.628** (df = 6; 889)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Control of Corruption (CoC) only. (2) Regression with CoC and inflation as control. (3) Regression with CoC and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with CoC and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with CoC and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with CoC and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with CoC and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 3. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Political Stability*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
				Dependent variable:			
				Violent Civil unrest			
Political Stability Lag	−0.084***	−0.073**	−0.121**	−0.100**	−0.081***	−0.084***	−0.118**
	(0.029)	(0.031)	(0.055)	(0.039)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.060)
Inflation Lag		0.0002					0.002
		(0.001)					(0.001)
Gini Lag			0.003				0.0002
			(0.006)				(0.006)
Unemployment Rate Lag				0.006			0.010**
				(0.004)			(0.005)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.005***		−0.012**
					(0.002)		(0.005)
Parliamentary Election						*0.003*	−0.014
						(0.020)	(0.029)
Observations	2,573	2,358	1,145	1,727	2,499	2,573	1,022
R^2	0.003	0.003	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.003	0.021
Adjusted R^2	−0.065	−0.071	−0.142	−0.093	−0.064	−0.066	−0.124
F Statistic	8.311*** (df = 1; 2406)	2.814* (df = 2; 2196)	2.797* (df = 2; 996)	4.864*** (df = 2; 1569)	7.442*** (df = 2; 2333)	4.162** (df = 2; 2405)	3.241*** (df = 6; 889)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Political Stability (PS) only. (2) Regression with PS and inflation as control. (3) Regression with PS and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with PS and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with PS and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with PS and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with PS and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 4. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Regulatory Quality*

				Dependent variable:			
				Violent Civil unrest			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Regulatory Quality Lag	0.034	0.015	0.073	0.075	0.030	0.034	0.065
	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.068)	(0.050)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.075)
Inflation Lag		0.0003					0.002
		(0.001)					(0.001)
Gini Lag			0.005				0.002
			(0.005)				(0.006)
Unemployment Rate Lag				0.007*			0.011**
				(0.004)			(0.005)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.005***		−0.011**
					(0.002)		(0.005)
Parliamentary Election						*0.002*	−0.014
						(0.020)	(0.029)
Observations	2,573	2,358	1,145	1,727	2,499	2,573	1,022
R^2	0.0003	0.0001	0.002	0.003	0.004	0.0003	0.018
Adjusted R^2	−0.069	−0.073	−0.146	−0.096	−0.067	−0.069	−0.128
F Statistic	0.689 (df = 1; 2406)	0.158 (df = 2; 2196)	0.965 (df = 2; 996)	2.677* (df = 2; 1569)	4.097** (df = 2; 2333)	0.350 (df = 2; 2405)	2.704** (df = 6; 889)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Regulatory Quality (RQ) only. (2) Regression with RQ and inflation as control. (3) Regression with RQ and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with RQ and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with RQ and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with RQ and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with RQ and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 5. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Rule of Law*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
				Dependent variable:			
				Violent Civil unrest			
Rule of Law Lag	0.068	0.057	0.189**	0.095	0.073	0.068	0.170*
	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.081)	(0.061)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.089)
Inflation Lag		0.0003					0.002
		(0.001)					(0.001)
Gini Lag			0.005				0.002
			(0.005)				(0.006)
Unemployment Rate Lag				0.007*			0.011**
				(0.004)			(0.005)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.005***		−0.009*
					(0.002)		(0.005)
Parliamentary Election						0.002	−0.016
						(0.020)	(0.029)
Observations	2,573	2,358	1,145	1,727	2,499	2,573	1,022
R^2	0.001	0.001	0.006	0.004	0.004	0.001	0.021
Adjusted R^2	−0.068	−0.073	−0.141	−0.096	−0.066	−0.069	−0.124
F Statistic	2.045 (df = 1; 2406)	0.713 (df = 2; 2196)	3.114** (df = 2; 996)	2.767* (df = 2; 1569)	4.918*** (df = 2; 2333)	1.025 (df = 2; 2405)	3.188*** (df = 6; 889)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Rule of Law (RoL) only. (2) Regression with RoL and inflation as control. (3) Regression with RoL and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with RoL and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with RoL and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with RoL and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with RoL and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 6. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Voice and Accountability*

	Dependent variable:						
	Violent Civil unrest						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Voice and Accountability Lag	−0.053	−0.058	0.012	−0.022	−0.051	−0.053	−0.170*
	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.089)	(0.061)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.099)
Inflation Lag		0.0003					0.002
		(0.001)					(0.001)
Gini Lag			0.005				0.001
			(0.005)				(0.006)
Unemployment Rate Lag				0.006*			0.010**
				(0.004)			(0.005)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.005***		−0.012**
					(0.002)		(0.005)
Parliamentary Election						0.002	−0.013
						(0.020)	(0.029)
Observations	2,573	2,358	1,145	1,727	2,499	2,573	1,022
R^2	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.004	0.001	0.020
Adjusted R^2	−0.068	−0.073	−0.148	−0.098	−0.067	−0.069	−0.125
F Statistic	1.349 (df = 1; 2406)	0.826 (df = 2; 2196)	0.388 (df = 2; 996)	1.625 (df = 2; 1569)	4.442** (df = 2; 2333)	0.680 (df = 2; 2405)	3.078*** (df = 6; 889)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Voice and Accountability (VA) only. (2) Regression with VA and inflation as control. (3) Regression with VA and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with VA and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with VA and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with VA and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with VA and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 1. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Government Effectiveness*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
				Dependent variable:			
				Significant Civil unrest			
Government Effectiveness Lag	0.009	0.009	0.032	0.023	0.009	0.008	0.045
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.042)	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.047)
Inflation Lag		−0.0001					−0.0004
		(0.0003)					(0.001)
Gini Lag			−0.005				−0.005
			(0.003)				(0.004)
Unemployment Rate Lag				−0.002			−0.002
				(0.002)			(0.003)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.001		−0.002
					(0.001)		(0.003)
Parliamentary Election						−0.017*	−0.022
						(0.010)	(0.018)
Observations	2,550	2,354	1,144	1,726	2,495	2,550	1,021
R^2	0.0001	0.0001	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.007
Adjusted R^2	−0.070	−0.073	−0.145	−0.099	−0.070	−0.069	−0.141
F Statistic	0.190 (df = 1; 2383)	0.091 (df = 2; 2192)	1.537 (df = 2; 995)	0.629 (df = 2; 1568)	0.773 (df = 2; 2329)	1.584 (df = 2; 2382)	1.057 (df = 6; 888)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Government Effectiveness (GE) only. (2) Regression with GE and inflation as control. (3) Regression with GE and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with GE and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with GE and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with GE and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with GE and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 2. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Control of Corruption*

				Dependent variable:			
				Significant Civil unrest			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Control of Corruption Lag	0.010	0.009	0.040	0.007	0.012	0.010	0.042
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.041)	(0.030)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.045)
Inflation Lag		−0.0001					−0.0004
		(0.0003)					(0.001)
Gini Lag			−0.005				−0.005
			(0.003)				(0.004)
Unemployment Rate Lag				−0.002			−0.002
				(0.002)			(0.003)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.001		−0.003
					(0.001)		(0.003)
Parliamentary Election						−0.017*	−0.022
						(0.010)	(0.018)
Observations	2,553	2,357	1,144	1,726	2,498	2,553	1,021
R^2	0.0001	0.0001	0.003	0.0004	0.001	0.001	0.007
Adjusted R^2	−0.069	−0.073	−0.145	−0.100	−0.070	−0.069	−0.141
F Statistic	0.259 (df = 1; 2386)	0.105 (df = 2; 2195)	1.723 (df = 2; 995)	0.348 (df = 2; 1568)	0.838 (df = 2; 2332)	1.618 (df = 2; 2385)	1.051 (df = 6; 888)

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Control of Corruption (CoC) only. (2) Regression with CoC and inflation as control. (3) Regression with CoC and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with CoC and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with CoC and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with CoC and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with CoC and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.*
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 3. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Political Stability*

	Dependent variable:						
	Significant Civil unrest						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Political Stability Lag	−0.008	−0.010	−0.037	−0.029	−0.006	−0.008	−0.060
	(0.014)	(0.016)	(0.032)	(0.022)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.037)
Inflation Lag		−0.0001					−0.001
		(0.0003)					(0.001)
Gini Lag			−0.005*				−0.006
			(0.003)				(0.004)
Unemployment Rate Lag				−0.002			−0.003
				(0.002)			(0.003)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.001		−0.003
					(0.001)		(0.003)
Parliamentary Election						−0.017*	−0.022
						(0.010)	(0.018)
Observations	2,553	2,357	1,144	1,726	2,498	2,553	1,021
R^2	0.0001	0.0002	0.004	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.009
Adjusted R^2	−0.069	−0.073	−0.144	−0.098	−0.070	−0.069	−0.138
F Statistic	0.313 (df = 1; 2386)	0.205 (df = 2; 2195)	1.905 (df = 2; 995)	1.206 (df = 2; 1568)	0.749 (df = 2; 2332)	1.647 (df = 2; 2385)	1.351 (df = 6; 888)

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Political Stability (PS) only. (2) Regression with PS and inflation as control. (3) Regression with PS and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with PS and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with PS and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with PS and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with PS and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.*
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 4. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Regulatory Quality*

				Dependent variable:			
				Significant Civil unrest			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Regulatory Quality Lag	0.013	0.011	0.032	0.025	0.014	0.013	0.027
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.039)	(0.028)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.046)
Inflation Lag		−0.0001					−0.0004
		(0.0003)					(0.001)
Gini Lag			−0.005				−0.005
			(0.003)				(0.004)
Unemployment Rate Lag				−0.001			−0.002
				(0.002)			(0.003)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.001		−0.003
					(0.001)		(0.003)
Parliamentary Election						−0.017*	−0.022
						(0.010)	(0.018)
Observations	2,553	2,357	1,144	1,726	2,498	2,553	1,021
R^2	0.0002	0.0001	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.006
Adjusted R^2	−0.069	−0.073	−0.145	−0.099	−0.070	−0.068	−0.141
F Statistic	0.454 (df = 1; 2386)	0.148 (df = 2; 2195)	1.575 (df = 2; 995)	0.731 (df = 2; 1568)	0.926 (df = 2; 2332)	1.701 (df = 2; 2385)	0.961 (df = 6; 888)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Regulatory Quality (RQ) only. (2) Regression with RQ and inflation as control. (3) Regression with RQ and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with RQ and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with RQ and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with RQ and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with RQ and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 5. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Rule of Law*

				Dependent variable:			
				Significant Civil unrest			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Rule of Law Lag	−0.002	−0.006	0.020	−0.004	−0.002	−0.001	0.008
	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.047)	(0.035)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.055)
Inflation Lag		−0.0001					−0.0004
		(0.0003)					(0.001)
Gini Lag			−0.005				−0.005
			(0.003)				(0.004)
Unemployment Rate Lag				−0.002			−0.002
				(0.002)			(0.003)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.001		−0.003
					(0.001)		(0.003)
Parliamentary Election						−0.017*	−0.022
						(0.010)	(0.018)
Observations	2,553	2,357	1,144	1,726	2,498	2,553	1,021
R^2	0.00000	0.00004	0.003	0.0004	0.001	0.001	0.006
Adjusted R^2	−0.070	−0.073	−0.146	−0.100	−0.070	−0.069	−0.142
F Statistic	0.005 (df = 1; 2386)	0.045 (df = 2; 2195)	1.334 (df = 2; 995)	0.332 (df = 2; 1568)	0.679 (df = 2; 2332)	1.505 (df = 2; 2385)	0.905 (df = 6; 888)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Rule of Law (RoL) only. (2) Regression with RoL and inflation as control. (3) Regression with RoL and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with RoL and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with RoL and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with RoL and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with RoL and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 6. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Voice and Accountability*

				Dependent variable:			
				Significant Civil unrest			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Voice and Accountability Lag	−0.019	−0.027	−0.029	−0.048	−0.019	−0.019	−0.044
	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.052)	(0.034)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.061)
Inflation Lag		−0.00005					−0.0004
		(0.0003)					(0.001)
Gini Lag			−0.005				−0.005
			(0.003)				(0.004)
Unemployment Rate Lag				−0.002			−0.003
				(0.002)			(0.003)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.001		−0.003
					(0.001)		(0.003)
Parliamentary Election						−0.017*	−0.022
						(0.010)	(0.018)
Observations	2,553	2,357	1,144	1,726	2,498	2,553	1,021
R^2	0.0003	0.001	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.007
Adjusted R^2	−0.069	−0.073	−0.146	−0.098	−0.070	−0.068	−0.141
F Statistic	0.762 (df = 1; 2386)	0.629 (df = 2; 2195)	1.406 (df = 2; 995)	1.322 (df = 2; 1568)	1.023 (df = 2; 2332)	1.860 (df = 2; 2385)	0.988 (df = 6; 888)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Voice and Accountability (VA) only. (2) Regression with VA and inflation as control. (3) Regression with VA and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with VA and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with VA and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with VA and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with VA and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 1. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Government Effectiveness for Advanced Economies*

	Dependent variable:						
	Civil unrest						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Government Effectiveness Lag	−0.025	0.021	−0.033	0.036	0.005	−0.028	0.024
	(0.090)	(0.094)	(0.131)	(0.097)	(0.094)	(0.090)	(0.135)
Inflation Lag		0.014					0.039**
		(0.009)					(0.016)
Gini Lag			0.011				0.005
			(0.015)				(0.015)
Unemployment Rate Lag				0.009			0.008
				(0.007)			(0.008)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.010		−0.011
					(0.007)		(0.008)
Parliamentary Election						−0.042	−0.030
						(0.037)	(0.042)
Observations	640	618	477	616	618	640	476
R^2	0.0001	0.005	0.002	0.003	0.004	0.002	0.023
Adjusted R^2	−0.087	−0.085	−0.116	−0.087	−0.086	−0.086	−0.102
F Statistic	0.079 (df = 1; 588)	1.295 (df = 2; 566)	0.357 (df = 2; 426)	0.825 (df = 2; 564)	1.078 (df = 2; 566)	0.673 (df = 2; 587)	1.665 (df = 6; 421)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Government Effectiveness (GE) only. (2) Regression with GE and inflation as control. (3) Regression with GE and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with GE and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with GE and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with GE and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with GE and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 2. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Government Effectiveness for Emerging and Developing Economies*

	Dependent variable:						
	Civil unrest						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Government Effectiveness Lag	−0.037	−0.031	0.163*	−0.007	−0.032	−0.037	0.216*
	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.092)	(0.071)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.110)
Inflation Lag		0.0004					0.003
		(0.001)					(0.002)
Gini Lag			−0.0002				0.006
			(0.007)				(0.008)
Unemployment Rate Lag				−0.004			−0.006
				(0.005)			(0.008)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.002		0.009
					(0.002)		(0.007)
Parliamentary Election						0.009	−0.019
						(0.025)	(0.044)
Observations	1,886	1,737	668	1,091	1,856	1,886	546
R^2	0.0003	0.0005	0.006	0.001	0.001	0.0004	0.018
Adjusted R^2	−0.076	−0.082	−0.212	−0.131	−0.078	−0.077	−0.214
F Statistic	0.595 (df = 1; 1751)	0.375 (df = 2; 1604)	1.574 (df = 2; 547)	0.353 (df = 2; 963)	0.782 (df = 2; 1720)	0.357 (df = 2; 1750)	1.346 (df = 6; 441)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Government Effectiveness (GE) only. (2) Regression with GE and inflation as control. (3) Regression with GE and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with GE and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with GE and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with GE and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with GE and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 3. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Control of Corruption for Advanced Economies*

	\(Dependent variable:\)						
	Civil unrest						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Control of Corruption Lag	−0.096	−0.050	−0.037	−0.033	−0.061	−0.094	0.026
	(0.099)	(0.103)	(0.126)	(0.106)	(0.102)	(0.099)	(0.130)
Inflation Lag		0.014					0.039**
		(0.009)					(0.016)
Gini Lag			0.012				0.005
			(0.015)				(0.015)
Unemployment Rate Lag				0.007			0.008
				(0.007)			(0.008)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.010		−0.011
					(0.007)		(0.008)
Parliamentary Election						−0.041	−0.030
						(0.037)	(0.042)
Observations	640	618	477	616	618	640	476
R^2	0.002	0.005	0.002	0.003	0.004	0.004	0.023
Adjusted R^2	−0.085	−0.085	−0.115	−0.087	−0.085	−0.085	−0.102
F Statistic	0.927 (df = 1; 588)	1.390 (df = 2; 566)	0.369 (df = 2; 426)	0.804 (df = 2; 564)	1.255 (df = 2; 566)	1.069 (df = 2; 587)	1.666 (df = 6; 421)

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Control of Corruption (CoC) only. (2) Regression with CoC and inflation as control. (3) Regression with CoC and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with CoC and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with CoC and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with CoC and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with CoC and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.*
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 4. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Control of Corruption for Emerging and Developing Economies*

	Dependent variable:						
	Civil unrest						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Control of Corruption Lag	−0.080*	−0.098*	−0.029	−0.041	−0.073	−0.080*	−0.038
	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.086)	(0.068)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.099)
Inflation Lag		0.0004					0.002
		(0.001)					(0.002)
Gini Lag			0.0003				0.006
			(0.007)				(0.008)
Unemployment Rate Lag				−0.004			−0.003
				(0.005)			(0.008)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.002		0.007
					(0.002)		(0.007)
Parliamentary Election						0.008	−0.020
						(0.025)	(0.044)
Observations	1,889	1,740	668	1,091	1,859	1,889	546
R^2	0.002	0.002	0.0002	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.010
Adjusted R^2	−0.075	−0.079	−0.219	−0.131	−0.076	−0.075	−0.224
F Statistic	2.862* (df = 1; 1754)	2.012 (df = 2; 1607)	0.059 (df = 2; 547)	0.528 (df = 2; 963)	1.693 (df = 2; 1723)	1.478 (df = 2; 1753)	0.726 (df = 6; 441)

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Control of Corruption (CoC) only. (2) Regression with CoC and inflation as control. (3) Regression with CoC and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with CoC and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with CoC and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with CoC and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with CoC and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.*

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 5. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Political Stability for Advanced Economies*

				Dependent variable:			
				Civil unrest			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Political Stability Lag	−0.093	−0.063	−0.136	−0.068	−0.064	−0.091	−0.085
	(0.089)	(0.091)	(0.122)	(0.093)	(0.091)	(0.089)	(0.125)
Inflation Lag		0.014					0.038**
		(0.009)					(0.016)
Gini Lag			0.012				0.006
			(0.014)				(0.015)
Unemployment Rate Lag				0.007			0.007
				(0.007)			(0.008)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.010		−0.010
					(0.007)		(0.008)
Parliamentary Election						−0.041	−0.030
						(0.037)	(0.042)
Observations	640	618	477	616	618	640	476
R^2	0.002	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.024
Adjusted R^2	−0.085	−0.084	−0.112	−0.086	−0.085	−0.084	−0.101
F Statistic	1.096 (df = 1; 588)	1.507 (df = 2; 566)	0.948 (df = 2; 426)	1.028 (df = 2; 564)	1.325 (df = 2; 566)	1.149 (df = 2; 587)	1.739 (df = 6; 421)

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Political Stability (PS) only. (2) Regression with PS and inflation as control. (3) Regression with PS and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with PS and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with PS and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with PS and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with PS and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.*

Source: Table created by the authors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
				Dependent variable:			
				Civil unrest			
Political Stability Lag	−0.100***	−0.084**	0.064	−0.065	−0.099***	−0.100***	0.053
	(0.033)	(0.035)	(0.065)	(0.048)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.076)
Inflation Lag		0.0003					0.002
		(0.001)					(0.002)
Gini Lag			0.0005				0.006
			(0.007)				(0.008)
Unemployment Rate Lag				−0.004			−0.004
				(0.005)			(0.008)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.002		0.007
					(0.002)		(0.007)
Parliamentary Election						0.010	−0.019
						(0.025)	(0.044)
Observations	1,889	1,740	668	1,091	1,859	1,889	546
R^2	0.005	0.004	0.002	0.003	0.006	0.005	0.011
Adjusted R^2	−0.071	−0.078	−0.217	−0.129	−0.072	−0.071	−0.223
F Statistic	9.196***	3.108**	0.490	1.269	4.791***	4.674***	0.781
	(df = 1; 1754)	(df = 2; 1607)	(df = 2; 547)	(df = 2; 963)	(df = 2; 1723)	(df = 2; 1753)	(df = 6; 441)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Political Stability (PS) only. (2) Regression with PS and inflation as control. (3) Regression with PS and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with PS and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with PS and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with PS and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with PS and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 7. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Regulatory Quality for Advanced Economies*

				Dependent variable:			
				Civil unrest			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Regulatory Quality Lag	−0.101	−0.089	−0.111	−0.030	−0.077	−0.101	−0.115
	(0.106)	(0.109)	(0.134)	(0.118)	(0.109)	(0.106)	(0.147)
Inflation Lag		0.015					0.039**
		(0.009)					(0.016)
Gini Lag			0.011				0.006
			(0.015)				(0.015)
Unemployment Rate Lag				0.007			0.005
				(0.007)			(0.009)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.010		−0.011
					(0.007)		(0.008)
Parliamentary Election						−0.042	−0.030
						(0.037)	(0.042)
Observations	640	618	477	616	618	640	476
R^2	0.002	0.006	0.003	0.003	0.005	0.004	0.025
Adjusted R^2	−0.085	−0.084	−0.114	−0.087	−0.085	−0.085	−0.101
F Statistic	0.897 (df = 1; 588)	1.606 (df = 2; 566)	0.667 (df = 2; 426)	0.789 (df = 2; 564)	1.328 (df = 2; 566)	1.080 (df = 2; 587)	1.764 (df = 6; 421)

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Regulatory Quality (RQ) only. (2) Regression with RQ and inflation as control. (3) Regression with RQ and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with RQ and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with RQ and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with RQ and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with RQ and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.*

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 8. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Regulatory Quality for Emerging and Developing Economies*

	Dependent variable:						
	Civil unrest						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Regulatory Quality Lag	−0.050	−0.042	−0.038	−0.008	−0.042	−0.049	−0.035
	(0.047)	(0.051)	(0.081)	(0.062)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.098)
Inflation Lag		0.0004					0.002
		(0.001)					(0.002)
Gini Lag			0.0003				0.006
			(0.007)				(0.008)
Unemployment Rate Lag				−0.004			−0.003
				(0.005)			(0.008)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.002		0.006
					(0.002)		(0.007)
Parliamentary Election						0.008	−0.020
						(0.025)	(0.044)
Observations	1,889	1,740	668	1,091	1,859	1,889	546
R^2	0.001	0.001	0.0004	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.010
Adjusted R^2	−0.076	−0.081	−0.219	−0.131	−0.077	−0.076	−0.224
F Statistic	1.143 (df = 1; 1754)	0.543 (df = 2; 1607)	0.110 (df = 2; 547)	0.357 (df = 2; 963)	0.987 (df = 2; 1723)	0.624 (df = 2; 1753)	0.722 (df = 6; 441)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Regulatory Quality (RQ) only. (2) Regression with RQ and inflation as control. (3) Regression with RQ and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with RQ and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with RQ and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with RQ and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with RQ and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 9. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Rule of Law for Advanced Economies*

			Dependent variable:				
			Civil unrest				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Rule of Law Lag	−0.113	−0.080	0.029	−0.043	−0.098	−0.113	0.054
	(0.114)	(0.116)	(0.161)	(0.126)	(0.116)	(0.114)	(0.174)
Inflation Lag		0.014					0.039**
		(0.009)					(0.016)
Gini Lag			0.012				0.005
			(0.015)				(0.015)
Unemployment Rate Lag				0.007			0.009
				(0.007)			(0.009)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.010		−0.011
					(0.007)		(0.008)
Parliamentary Election						−0.041	−0.030
						(0.037)	(0.042)
Observations	640	618	477	616	618	640	476
R^2	0.002	0.005	0.002	0.003	0.005	0.004	0.023
Adjusted R^2	−0.085	−0.084	−0.116	−0.087	−0.085	−0.084	−0.102
F Statistic	0.989 (df = 1; 588)	1.508 (df = 2; 566)	0.341 (df = 2; 426)	0.816 (df = 2; 564)	1.432 (df = 2; 566)	1.116 (df = 2; 587)	1.676 (df = 6; 421)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Rule of Law (RoL) only. (2) Regression with RoL and inflation as control. (3) Regression with RoL and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with RoL and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with RoL and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with RoL and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with RoL and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 10. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Rule of Law for Emerging and Developing Economies*

	Dependent variable:						
	Civil unrest						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Rule of Law Lag	−0.025	−0.011	−0.026	−0.018	−0.009	−0.025	0.014
	(0.057)	(0.061)	(0.097)	(0.080)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.117)
Inflation Lag		0.0004					0.002
		(0.001)					(0.002)
Gini Lag			0.0004				0.006
			(0.007)				(0.008)
Unemployment Rate Lag				−0.004			−0.004
				(0.005)			(0.008)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.002		0.007
					(0.002)		(0.007)
Parliamentary Election						0.009	−0.020
						(0.025)	(0.044)
Observations	1,889	1,740	668	1,091	1,859	1,889	546
R^2	0.0001	0.0003	0.0001	0.001	0.001	0.0002	0.009
Adjusted R^2	−0.076	−0.082	−0.219	−0.131	−0.078	−0.077	−0.224
F Statistic	0.201 (df = 1; 1754)	0.225 (df = 2; 1607)	0.036 (df = 2; 547)	0.374 (df = 2; 963)	0.611 (df = 2; 1723)	0.164 (df = 2; 1753)	0.703 (df = 6; 441)

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Rule of Law (RoL) only. (2) Regression with RoL and inflation as control. (3) Regression with RoL and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with RoL and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with RoL and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with RoL and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with RoL and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.*

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 11. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Voice and Accountability for Advanced Economies*

				Dependent variable:			
				Civil unrest			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Voice and Accountability Lag	−0.698***	−0.690***	−0.726***	−0.684***	−0.699***	−0.697***	−0.777***
	(0.176)	(0.182)	(0.255)	(0.189)	(0.182)	(0.176)	(0.276)
Inflation Lag		0.013					0.036**
		(0.009)					(0.016)
Gini Lag			0.010				0.008
			(0.014)				(0.015)
Unemployment Rate Lag				0.002			−0.001
				(0.007)			(0.009)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.010		−0.013*
					(0.007)		(0.008)
Parliamentary Election						−0.040	−0.023
						(0.037)	(0.041)
Observations	640	618	477	616	618	640	476
R^2	0.026	0.029	0.020	0.025	0.029	0.028	0.041
Adjusted R^2	−0.059	−0.058	−0.095	−0.063	−0.058	−0.058	−0.082
F Statistic	15.680*** (df = 1; 588)	8.510*** (df = 2; 566)	4.373** (df = 2; 426)	7.324*** (df = 2; 564)	8.507*** (df = 2; 566)	8.450*** (df = 2; 587)	3.010*** (df = 6; 421)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Voice and Accountability (VA) only. (2) Regression with VA and inflation as control. (3) Regression with VA and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with VA and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with VA and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with VA and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with VA and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 12. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Voice and Accountability for Emerging and Developing Economies*

| | Dependent variable: |
| | Civil unrest |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Voice and Accountability Lag	−0.059	−0.047	−0.070	−0.032	−0.063	−0.059	−0.241**
	(0.050)	(0.052)	(0.099)	(0.071)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.116)
Inflation Lag		0.0004					0.003*
		(0.001)					(0.002)
Gini Lag			0.0003				0.006
			(0.007)				(0.008)
Unemployment Rate Lag				−0.004			−0.002
				(0.005)			(0.008)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.002		0.006
					(0.002)		(0.007)
Parliamentary Election						0.009	−0.020
						(0.025)	(0.044)
Observations	1,889	1,740	668	1,091	1,859	1,889	546
R^2	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.019
Adjusted R^2	−0.076	−0.081	−0.218	−0.131	−0.077	−0.076	−0.212
F Statistic	1.387 (df = 1; 1754)	0.608 (df = 2; 1607)	0.250 (df = 2; 547)	0.449 (df = 2; 963)	1.374 (df = 2; 1723)	0.764 (df = 2; 1753)	1.420 (df = 6; 441)

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Voice and Accountability (VA) only. (2) Regression with VA and inflation as control. (3) Regression with VA and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with VA and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with VA and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with VA and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with VA and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.*

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 1. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Government Effectiveness for Advanced Economies*

	Dependent variable:						
	Violent civil unrest						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Government Effectiveness Lag	0.033	0.022	0.152	0.068	0.023	0.031	0.220*
	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.118)	(0.079)	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.120)
Inflation Lag		−0.001					0.026*
		(0.007)					(0.014)
Gini Lag			0.011				−0.004
			(0.013)				(0.014)
Unemployment Rate Lag				0.015***			0.023***
				(0.005)			(0.007)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.015***		−0.011
					(0.006)		(0.007)
Parliamentary Election						−0.029	−0.025
						(0.032)	(0.037)
Observations	640	618	477	616	618	640	476
R^2	0.0003	0.0002	0.005	0.013	0.013	0.002	0.040
Adjusted R^2	−0.086	−0.090	−0.112	−0.076	−0.076	−0.087	−0.083
F Statistic	0.180 (df = 1; 588)	0.048 (df = 2; 566)	1.081 (df = 2; 426)	3.850** (df = 2; 564)	3.665** (df = 2; 566)	0.521 (df = 2; 587)	2.932*** (df = 6; 421)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Government Effectiveness (GE) only. (2) Regression with GE and inflation as control. (3) Regression with GE and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with GE and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with GE and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with GE and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with GE and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 2. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Government Effectiveness for Emerging and Developing Economies*

	Dependent variable:						
	Violent civil unrest						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Government Effectiveness Lag	−0.015	−0.033	0.206**	0.074	−0.010	−0.015	0.186
	(0.049)	(0.054)	(0.100)	(0.073)	(0.050)	(0.049)	(0.119)
Inflation Lag		0.0003					0.002
		(0.001)					(0.002)
Gini Lag			−0.001				0.0002
			(0.007)				(0.009)
Unemployment Rate Lag				0.002			0.004
				(0.005)			(0.009)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.004*		−0.007
					(0.002)		(0.008)
Parliamentary Election						0.018	0.013
						(0.025)	(0.047)
Observations	1,886	1,737	668	1,091	1,856	1,886	546
R^2	0.0001	0.0003	0.008	0.001	0.002	0.0003	0.016
Adjusted R^2	−0.076	−0.082	−0.210	−0.130	−0.076	−0.077	−0.216
F Statistic	0.094 (df = 1; 1751)	0.275 (df = 2; 1604)	2.120 (df = 2; 547)	0.681 (df = 2; 963)	1.649 (df = 2; 1720)	0.302 (df = 2; 1750)	1.187 (df = 6; 441)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Government Effectiveness (GE) only. (2) Regression with GE and inflation as control. (3) Regression with GE and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with GE and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with GE and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with GE and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with GE and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 3. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Control of Corruption for Advanced Economies*

	Dependent variable:						
	Violent civil unrest						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Control of Corruption Lag	0.037	0.013	0.027	0.075	0.022	0.038	0.120
	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.114)	(0.087)	(0.084)	(0.085)	(0.117)
Inflation Lag		−0.001					0.024*
		(0.007)					(0.014)
Gini Lag			0.009				−0.006
			(0.013)				(0.014)
Unemployment Rate Lag				0.015***			0.022***
				(0.006)			(0.007)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.015***		−0.012*
					(0.006)		(0.007)
Parliamentary Election						−0.030	−0.028
						(0.032)	(0.037)
Observations	640	618	477	616	618	640	476
R^2	0.0003	0.0001	0.001	0.013	0.013	0.002	0.035
Adjusted R^2	−0.086	−0.090	−0.116	−0.076	−0.076	−0.087	−0.089
F Statistic	0.189 (df = 1; 588)	0.021 (df = 2; 566)	0.281 (df = 2; 426)	3.857** (df = 2; 564)	3.654** (df = 2; 566)	0.542 (df = 2; 587)	2.539** (df = 6; 421)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Control of Corruption (CoC) only. (2) Regression with CoC and inflation as control. (3) Regression with CoC and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with CoC and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with CoC and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with CoC and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with CoC and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 4. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Control of Corruption for Emerging and Developing Economies*

	Dependent variable:						
	Violent civil unrest						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Control of Corruption Lag	−0.052	−0.067	0.055	0.053	−0.044	−0.051	0.036
	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.094)	(0.070)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.106)
Inflation Lag		0.0003					0.002
		(0.001)					(0.002)
Gini Lag			−0.001				0.0003
			(0.007)				(0.009)
Unemployment Rate Lag				0.002			0.006
				(0.005)			(0.009)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.004*		−0.009
					(0.002)		(0.008)
Parliamentary Election						0.017	0.012
						(0.025)	(0.047)
Observations	1,889	1,740	668	1,091	1,859	1,889	546
R^2	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.011
Adjusted R^2	−0.076	−0.081	−0.219	−0.131	−0.076	−0.076	−0.223
F Statistic	1.184 (df = 1; 1754)	0.906 (df = 2; 1607)	0.172 (df = 2; 547)	0.455 (df = 2; 963)	2.069 (df = 2; 1723)	0.830 (df = 2; 1753)	0.793 (df = 6; 441)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Control of Corruption (CoC) only. (2) Regression with CoC and inflation as control. (3) Regression with CoC and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with CoC and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with CoC and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with CoC and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with CoC and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 5. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Political Stability for Advanced Economies*

				Dependent variable:			
				Violent civil unrest			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Political Stability Lag	−0.167**	−0.172**	−0.388***	−0.135*	−0.150**	−0.165**	−0.302***
	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.109)	(0.076)	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.111)
Inflation Lag		−0.003					0.018
		(0.007)					(0.014)
Gini Lag			0.009				−0.003
			(0.013)				(0.014)
Unemployment Rate Lag				0.012**			0.017**
				(0.005)			(0.007)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.014**		−0.010
					(0.006)		(0.007)
Parliamentary Election						−0.028	−0.025
						(0.032)	(0.037)
Observations	640	618	477	616	618	640	476
R^2	0.008	0.009	0.030	0.018	0.020	0.010	0.049
Adjusted R^2	−0.078	−0.080	−0.084	−0.071	−0.069	−0.078	−0.073
F Statistic	4.871** (df = 1; 588)	2.600* (df = 2; 566)	6.567*** (df = 2; 426)	5.088*** (df = 2; 564)	5.651*** (df = 2; 566)	2.831* (df = 2; 587)	3.621*** (df = 6; 421)

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Political Stability (PS) only. (2) Regression with PS and inflation as control. (3) Regression with PS and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with PS and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with PS and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with PS and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with PS and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.*
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 6. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Political Stability for Emerging and Developing Economies*

				Dependent variable:			
				Violent civil unrest			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Political Stability Lag	−0.069**	−0.056	−0.047	−0.074	−0.068**	−0.069**	−0.059
	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.071)	(0.049)	(0.035)	(0.033)	(0.082)
Inflation Lag		0.0002					0.002
		(0.001)					(0.002)
Gini Lag			−0.001				0.0003
			(0.007)				(0.009)
Unemployment Rate Lag				0.003			0.007
				(0.005)			(0.008)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.004*		−0.009
					(0.002)		(0.008)
Parliamentary Election						0.019	0.011
						(0.025)	(0.047)
Observations	1,889	1,740	668	1,091	1,859	1,889	546
R^2	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.003	0.004	0.003	0.012
Adjusted R^2	−0.074	−0.080	−0.218	−0.129	−0.074	−0.074	−0.221
F Statistic	4.265** (df = 1; 1754)	1.307 (df = 2; 1607)	0.222 (df = 2; 547)	1.305 (df = 2; 963)	3.649** (df = 2; 1723)	2.411* (df = 2; 1753)	0.862 (df = 6; 441)

*Note: $p<0.1$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$. (1) Regression with Political Stability (PS) only. (2) Regression with PS and inflation as control. (3) Regression with PS and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with PS and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with PS and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with PS and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with PS and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.*

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 7. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Regulatory Quality for Advanced Economies*

				Dependent variable:			
				Violent civil unrest			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Regulatory Quality Lag	−0.073	−0.092	−0.156	−0.021	−0.093	−0.073	−0.074
	(0.091)	(0.090)	(0.121)	(0.097)	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.132)
Inflation Lag		−0.0004					0.022
		(0.007)					(0.014)
Gini Lag			0.008				−0.005
			(0.013)				(0.014)
Unemployment Rate Lag				0.014**			0.019**
				(0.006)			(0.008)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.015***		−0.013*
					(0.006)		(0.007)
Parliamentary Election						−0.030	−0.026
						(0.032)	(0.037)
Observations	640	618	477	616	618	640	476
R^2	0.001	0.002	0.005	0.012	0.014	0.003	0.033
Adjusted R^2	−0.086	−0.088	−0.112	−0.077	−0.074	−0.086	−0.091
F Statistic	0.642 (df = 1; 588)	0.528 (df = 2; 566)	1.083 (df = 2; 426)	3.505** (df = 2; 564)	4.161** (df = 2; 566)	0.763 (df = 2; 587)	2.411** (df = 6; 421)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Regulatory Quality (RQ) only. (2) Regression with RQ and inflation as control. (3) Regression with RQ and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with RQ and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with RQ and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with RQ and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with RQ and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.

Source: Table created by the authors

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Table 8. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Regulatory Quality for Emerging and Developing Economies*

	Dependent variable:						
	Violent civil unrest						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Regulatory Quality Lag	0.039	0.021	0.118	0.105*	0.039	0.040	0.126
	(0.047)	(0.052)	(0.088)	(0.064)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.105)
Inflation Lag		0.0003					0.002
		(0.001)					(0.002)
Gini Lag			−0.001				0.00005
			(0.007)				(0.009)
Unemployment Rate Lag				0.002			0.005
				(0.005)			(0.009)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.004*		−0.008
					(0.002)		(0.008)
Parliamentary Election						0.019	0.013
						(0.025)	(0.047)
Observations	1,889	1,740	668	1,091	1,859	1,889	546
R^2	0.0004	0.0002	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.014
Adjusted R^2	−0.076	−0.082	−0.215	−0.128	−0.076	−0.076	−0.219
F Statistic	0.684 (df = 1; 1754)	0.176 (df = 2; 1607)	0.903 (df = 2; 547)	1.540 (df = 2; 963)	2.024 (df = 2; 1723)	0.621 (df = 2; 1753)	1.017 (df = 6; 441)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Regulatory Quality (RQ) only. (2) Regression with RQ and inflation as control. (3) Regression with RQ and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with RQ and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with RQ and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with RQ and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with RQ and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 9. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Rule of Law for Advanced Economies*

				Dependent variable:			
				Violent civil unrest			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Rule of Law Lag	0.006	0.009	0.086	0.110	−0.006	0.007	0.212
	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.146)	(0.104)	(0.096)	(0.097)	(0.156)
Inflation Lag		−0.001					0.023
		(0.007)					(0.014)
Gini Lag			0.010				−0.005
			(0.013)				(0.014)
Unemployment Rate Lag				0.016***			0.024***
				(0.006)			(0.008)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.015***		−0.011
					(0.006)		(0.007)
Parliamentary Election						−0.030	−0.027
						(0.032)	(0.037)
Observations	640	618	477	616	618	640	476
R^2	0.00001	0.00004	0.002	0.014	0.013	0.002	0.037
Adjusted R^2	−0.087	−0.090	−0.115	−0.075	−0.076	−0.087	−0.087
F Statistic	0.004 (df = 1; 588)	0.012 (df = 2; 566)	0.430 (df = 2; 426)	4.050** (df = 2; 564)	3.622** (df = 2; 566)	0.441 (df = 2; 587)	2.675** (df = 6; 421)

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Rule of Law (RoL) only. (2) Regression with RoL and inflation as control. (3) Regression with RoL and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with RoL and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with RoL and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with RoL and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with RoL and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.*

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 10. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Rule of Law for Emerging and Developing Economies*

	Dependent variable:						
	Violent civil unrest						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Rule of Law Lag	0.070	0.059	0.219**	0.120	0.080	0.070	0.201
	(0.057)	(0.062)	(0.105)	(0.082)	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.125)
Inflation Lag		0.0003					0.002
		(0.001)					(0.002)
Gini Lag			−0.002				−0.0005
			(0.007)				(0.009)
Unemployment Rate Lag				0.002			0.005
				(0.005)			(0.009)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.004*		−0.007
					(0.002)		(0.008)
Parliamentary Election						0.018	0.009
						(0.025)	(0.047)
Observations	1,889	1,740	668	1,091	1,859	1,889	546
R^2	0.001	0.001	0.008	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.016
Adjusted R^2	−0.075	−0.081	−0.210	−0.129	−0.075	−0.076	−0.216
F Statistic	1.499 (df = 1; 1754)	0.542 (df = 2; 1607)	2.165 (df = 2; 547)	1.239 (df = 2; 963)	2.608* (df = 2; 1723)	1.009 (df = 2; 1753)	1.208 (df = 6; 441)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Rule of Law (RoL) only. (2) Regression with RoL and inflation as control. (3) Regression with RoL and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with RoL and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with RoL and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with RoL and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with RoL and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 11. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Voice and Accountability for Advanced Economies*

				Dependent variable:			
				Violent civil unrest			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Voice and Accountability Lag	−0.222	−0.239	−0.449*	−0.157	−0.241	−0.221	−0.298
	(0.152)	(0.152)	(0.233)	(0.157)	(0.151)	(0.152)	(0.250)
Inflation Lag		−0.001					0.021
		(0.007)					(0.014)
Gini Lag			0.008				−0.005
			(0.013)				(0.014)
Unemployment Rate Lag				0.013**			0.017**
				(0.006)			(0.008)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.015***		−0.013*
					(0.006)		(0.007)
Parliamentary Election						−0.029	−0.024
						(0.032)	(0.037)
Observations	640	618	477	616	618	640	476
R^2	0.004	0.004	0.010	0.014	0.017	0.005	0.036
Adjusted R^2	−0.083	−0.085	−0.106	−0.075	−0.072	−0.083	−0.088
F Statistic	2.127 (df = 1; 588)	1.235 (df = 2; 566)	2.119 (df = 2; 426)	3.987** (df = 2; 564)	4.908*** (df = 2; 566)	1.493 (df = 2; 587)	2.602** (df = 6; 421)

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Voice and Accountability (VA) only. (2) Regression with VA and inflation as control. (3) Regression with VA and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with VA and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with VA and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with VA and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with VA and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.*
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 12. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Voice and Accountability for Emerging and Developing Economies*

	Dependent variable:						
	Violent civil unrest						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Voice and Accountability Lag	−0.048	−0.049	0.049	0.011	−0.043	−0.049	−0.170
	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.108)	(0.073)	(0.051)	(0.050)	(0.125)
Inflation Lag		0.0003					0.002
		(0.001)					(0.002)
Gini Lag			−0.0005				0.0004
			(0.007)				(0.009)
Unemployment Rate Lag				0.003			0.008
				(0.005)			(0.008)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.004*		−0.010
					(0.002)		(0.008)
Parliamentary Election						0.018	0.012
						(0.025)	(0.047)
Observations	1,889	1,740	668	1,091	1,859	1,889	546
R^2	0.001	0.001	0.0004	0.0004	0.002	0.001	0.015
Adjusted R^2	−0.076	−0.081	−0.219	−0.131	−0.076	−0.076	−0.218
F Statistic	0.926 (df = 1; 1754)	0.509 (df = 2; 1607)	0.104 (df = 2; 547)	0.177 (df = 2; 963)	2.041 (df = 2; 1723)	0.735 (df = 2; 1753)	1.084 (df = 6; 441)

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Voice and Accountability (VA) only. (2) Regression with VA and inflation as control. (3) Regression with VA and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with VA and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with VA and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with VA and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with VA and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.*

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 1. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Government Effectiveness for Advanced Economies*

	Dependent variable:						
	Significant civil unrest						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Government Effectiveness Lag	−0.021	−0.025	−0.059	−0.035	−0.023	−0.024	−0.061
	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.088)	(0.061)	(0.059)	(0.059)	(0.092)
Inflation Lag		−0.002					0.005
		(0.006)					(0.011)
Gini Lag			−0.019*				−0.020*
			(0.010)				(0.010)
Unemployment Rate Lag				−0.004			−0.0004
				(0.004)			(0.006)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.005		−0.007
					(0.004)		(0.005)
Parliamentary Election						−0.035	−0.034
						(0.024)	(0.028)
Observations	620	617	476	615	617	620	475
R^2	0.0002	0.0005	0.009	0.002	0.002	0.004	0.017
Adjusted R^2	−0.090	−0.090	−0.107	−0.089	−0.088	−0.087	−0.109
F Statistic	0.128 (df = 1; 568)	0.133 (df = 2; 565)	1.962 (df = 2; 425)	0.465 (df = 2; 563)	0.660 (df = 2; 565)	1.171 (df = 2; 567)	1.227 (df = 6; 420)

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Government Effectiveness (GE) only. (2) Regression with GE and inflation as control. (3) Regression with GE and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with GE and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with GE and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with GE and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with GE and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.*
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 2. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Government Effectiveness for Emerging and Developing Economies*

	Dependent variable:						
	Significant civil unrest						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Government Effectiveness Lag	0.012	0.013	0.067	0.038	0.013	0.012	0.143**
	(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.048)	(0.034)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.060)
Inflation Lag		−0.0001					−0.0004
		(0.0003)					(0.001)
Gini Lag			−0.002				−0.002
			(0.003)				(0.004)
Unemployment Rate Lag				−0.002			−0.006
				(0.002)			(0.004)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.001		−0.0001
					(0.001)		(0.004)
Parliamentary Election						−0.009	−0.007
						(0.010)	(0.024)
Observations	1,886	1,737	668	1,091	1,856	1,886	546
R^2	0.0002	0.0002	0.004	0.002	0.0005	0.001	0.017
Adjusted R^2	−0.076	−0.082	−0.214	−0.130	−0.078	−0.076	−0.215
F Statistic	0.343 (df = 1; 1751)	0.184 (df = 2; 1604)	1.226 (df = 2; 547)	0.833 (df = 2; 963)	0.427 (df = 2; 1720)	0.573 (df = 2; 1750)	1.253 (df = 6; 441)

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Government Effectiveness (GE) only. (2) Regression with GE and inflation as control. (3) Regression with GE and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with GE and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with GE and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with GE and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with GE and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.*

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 3. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Control of Corruption for Advanced Economies*

	Dependent variable:						
	Significant civil unrest						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Control of Corruption Lag	0.029	0.026	0.109	0.016	0.030	0.031	0.131
	(0.064)	(0.065)	(0.085)	(0.067)	(0.064)	(0.064)	(0.089)
Inflation Lag		−0.001					0.008
		(0.006)					(0.011)
Gini Lag			−0.018*				−0.021**
			(0.010)				(0.010)
Unemployment Rate Lag				−0.003			0.002
				(0.004)			(0.006)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.005		−0.006
					(0.004)		(0.005)
Parliamentary Election						−0.035	−0.036
						(0.024)	(0.028)
Observations	620	617	476	615	617	620	475
R^2	0.0004	0.0004	0.012	0.001	0.002	0.004	0.021
Adjusted R^2	−0.089	−0.090	−0.104	−0.089	−0.088	−0.087	−0.105
F Statistic	0.209 (df = 1; 568)	0.125 (df = 2; 565)	2.563* (df = 2; 425)	0.327 (df = 2; 563)	0.693 (df = 2; 565)	1.207 (df = 2; 567)	1.523 (df = 6; 420)

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Control of Corruption (CoC) only. (2) Regression with CoC and inflation as control. (3) Regression with CoC and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with CoC and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with CoC and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with CoC and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with CoC and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.*

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 4. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Control of Corruption for Emerging and Developing Economies*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
				Dependent variable:			
				Significant civil unrest			
Control of Corruption Lag	0.005	0.002	0.007	−0.004	0.005	0.004	0.017
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.045)	(0.033)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.053)
Inflation Lag		−0.0001					−0.0005
		(0.0003)					(0.001)
Gini Lag			−0.002				−0.002
			(0.003)				(0.004)
Unemployment Rate Lag				−0.001			−0.005
				(0.002)			(0.004)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.001		−0.001
					(0.001)		(0.004)
Parliamentary Election						−0.009	−0.007
						(0.010)	(0.024)
Observations	1,889	1,740	668	1,091	1,859	1,889	546
R^2	0.00003	0.00004	0.001	0.0004	0.0003	0.0005	0.004
Adjusted R^2	−0.076	−0.082	−0.218	−0.131	−0.078	−0.076	−0.231
F Statistic	0.057 (df = 1; 1754)	0.032 (df = 2; 1607)	0.234 (df = 2; 547)	0.216 (df = 2; 963)	0.277 (df = 2; 1723)	0.431 (df = 2; 1753)	0.316 (df = 6; 441)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Control of Corruption (CoC) only. (2) Regression with CoC and inflation as control. (3) Regression with CoC and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with CoC and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with CoC and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with CoC and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with CoC and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 5. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Political Stability for Advanced Economies*

	Dependent variable:						
	Significant civil unrest						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Political Stability Lag	−0.171***	−0.175***	−0.141*	−0.186***	−0.166***	−0.170***	−0.131
	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.083)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.057)	(0.085)
Inflation Lag		−0.003					0.004
		(0.006)					(0.011)
Gini Lag			−0.018*				−0.019*
			(0.010)				(0.010)
Unemployment Rate Lag				−0.005			−0.001
				(0.004)			(0.006)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.003		−0.006
					(0.004)		(0.005)
Parliamentary Election						−0.034	−0.033
						(0.024)	(0.028)
Observations	620	617	476	615	617	620	475
R²	0.016	0.016	0.015	0.019	0.017	0.019	0.022
Adjusted R²	−0.073	−0.072	−0.101	−0.070	−0.072	−0.070	−0.104
F Statistic	9.120*** (df = 1; 568)	4.716*** (df = 2; 565)	3.218** (df = 2; 425)	5.455*** (df = 2; 563)	4.848*** (df = 2; 565)	5.629*** (df = 2; 567)	1.557 (df = 6; 420)

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Political Stability (PS) only. (2) Regression with PS and inflation as control. (3) Regression with PS and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with PS and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with PS and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with PS and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with PS and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.*

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 6. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Political Stability for Emerging and Developing Economies*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Dependent variable:						
	Significant civil unrest						
Political Stability Lag	0.010	0.010	−0.009	0.004	0.013	0.010	−0.031
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.034)	(0.023)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.041)
Inflation Lag		−0.0001					−0.001
		(0.0003)					(0.001)
Gini Lag			−0.002				−0.002
			(0.003)				(0.004)
Unemployment Rate Lag				−0.002			−0.004
				(0.002)			(0.004)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.001		−0.001
					(0.001)		(0.004)
Parliamentary Election						−0.009	−0.008
						(0.010)	(0.024)
Observations	1,889	1,740	668	1,091	1,859	1,889	546
R^2	0.0003	0.0003	0.001	0.0005	0.001	0.001	0.005
Adjusted R^2	−0.076	−0.082	−0.218	−0.131	−0.078	−0.076	−0.229
F Statistic	0.497 (df = 1; 1754)	0.245 (df = 2; 1607)	0.261 (df = 2; 547)	0.224 (df = 2; 963)	0.628 (df = 2; 1723)	0.665 (df = 2; 1753)	0.392 (df = 6; 441)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Political Stability (PS) only. (2) Regression with PS and inflation as control. (3) Regression with PS and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with PS and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with PS and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with PS and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with PS and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 7. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Regulatory Quality for Advanced Economies*

				Dependent variable:			
				Significant civil unrest			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Regulatory Quality Lag	−0.017	−0.017	0.035	−0.043	−0.018	−0.018	0.039
	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.091)	(0.074)	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.100)
Inflation Lag		−0.002					0.006
		(0.006)					(0.011)
Gini Lag			−0.018*				−0.020*
			(0.010)				(0.010)
Unemployment Rate Lag				−0.004			0.001
				(0.004)			(0.006)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.005		−0.006
					(0.004)		(0.005)
Parliamentary Election						−0.035	−0.034
						(0.024)	(0.028)
Observations	620	617	476	615	617	620	475
R^2	0.0001	0.0003	0.008	0.002	0.002	0.004	0.017
Adjusted R^2	−0.090	−0.090	−0.108	−0.089	−0.088	−0.087	−0.110
F Statistic	0.064 (df = 1; 568)	0.074 (df = 2; 565)	1.813 (df = 2; 425)	0.464 (df = 2; 563)	0.621 (df = 2; 565)	1.123 (df = 2; 567)	1.178 (df = 6; 420)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Regulatory Quality (RQ) only. (2) Regression with RQ and inflation as control. (3) Regression with RQ and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with RQ and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with RQ and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with RQ and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with RQ and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 8. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Regulatory Quality for Emerging and Developing Economies*

	Dependent variable:						
	Significant civil unrest						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Regulatory Quality Lag	0.016	0.014	0.018	0.033	0.017	0.015	0.032
	(0.020)	(0.022)	(0.042)	(0.030)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.053)
Inflation Lag		−0.0001					−0.0005
		(0.0003)					(0.001)
Gini Lag			−0.002				−0.002
			(0.003)				(0.004)
Unemployment Rate Lag				−0.002			−0.005
				(0.002)			(0.004)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.001		−0.001
					(0.001)		(0.004)
Parliamentary Election						−0.009	−0.007
						(0.010)	(0.024)
Observations	1,889	1,740	668	1,091	1,859	1,889	546
R^2	0.0004	0.0003	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.005
Adjusted R^2	−0.076	−0.082	−0.218	−0.130	−0.078	−0.076	−0.230
F Statistic	0.638 (df = 1; 1754)	0.236 (df = 2; 1607)	0.317 (df = 2; 547)	0.808 (df = 2; 963)	0.591 (df = 2; 1723)	0.705 (df = 2; 1753)	0.357 (df = 6; 441)

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Regulatory Quality (RQ) only. (2) Regression with RQ and inflation as control. (3) Regression with RQ and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with RQ and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with RQ and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with RQ and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with RQ and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.*

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 9. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Rule of Law for Advanced Economies*

				Dependent variable:			
				Significant civil unrest			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Rule of Law Lag	−0.060	−0.062	−0.040	−0.095	−0.066	−0.059	−0.062
	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.109)	(0.079)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.119)
Inflation Lag		−0.002					0.006
		(0.006)					(0.011)
Gini Lag			−0.019*				−0.020*
			(0.010)				(0.010)
Unemployment Rate Lag				−0.005			−0.001
				(0.004)			(0.006)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.005		−0.007
					(0.004)		(0.005)
Parliamentary Election						−0.035	−0.033
						(0.024)	(0.028)
Observations	620	617	476	615	617	620	475
R^2	0.001	0.001	0.008	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.017
Adjusted R^2	−0.089	−0.089	−0.108	−0.087	−0.086	−0.086	−0.110
F Statistic	0.672 (df = 1; 568)	0.405 (df = 2; 565)	1.806 (df = 2; 425)	1.022 (df = 2; 563)	0.994 (df = 2; 565)	1.423 (df = 2; 567)	1.199 (df = 6; 420)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Rule of Law (RoL) only. (2) Regression with RoL and inflation as control. (3) Regression with RoL and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with RoL and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with RoL and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with RoL and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with RoL and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 10. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Rule of Law for Emerging and Developing Economies*

				Dependent variable:			
				Significant civil unrest			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Rule of Law Lag	0.006	0.001	0.029	0.012	0.006	0.006	0.038
	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.050)	(0.039)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.063)
Inflation Lag		−0.0001					−0.001
		(0.0003)					(0.001)
Gini Lag			−0.002				−0.002
			(0.003)				(0.004)
Unemployment Rate Lag				−0.002			−0.005
				(0.002)			(0.004)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.001		−0.001
					(0.001)		(0.004)
Parliamentary Election						−0.009	−0.008
						(0.010)	(0.024)
Observations	1,889	1,740	668	1,091	1,859	1,889	546
R^2	0.00004	0.00004	0.001	0.001	0.0003	0.001	0.005
Adjusted R^2	−0.076	−0.082	−0.218	−0.131	−0.078	−0.076	−0.230
F Statistic	0.067 (df = 1; 1754)	0.029 (df = 2; 1607)	0.385 (df = 2; 547)	0.253 (df = 2; 963)	0.275 (df = 2; 1723)	0.442 (df = 2; 1753)	0.360 (df = 6; 441)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Rule of Law (RoL) only. (2) Regression with RoL and inflation as control. (3) Regression with RoL and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with RoL and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with RoL and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with RoL and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with RoL and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 11. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Voice and Accountability for Advanced Economies*

				Dependent variable:			
				Significant civil unrest			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Voice and Accountability Lag	−0.337***	−0.345***	−0.240	−0.394***	−0.345***	−0.336***	−0.281
	(0.114)	(0.115)	(0.174)	(0.119)	(0.115)	(0.114)	(0.189)
Inflation Lag		−0.002					0.005
		(0.006)					(0.011)
Gini Lag			−0.019*				−0.019*
			(0.010)				(0.010)
Unemployment Rate Lag				−0.007			−0.003
				(0.004)			(0.006)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.005		−0.007
					(0.004)		(0.005)
Parliamentary Election						−0.035	−0.031
						(0.024)	(0.028)
Observations	620	617	476	615	617	620	475
R^2	0.015	0.016	0.013	0.020	0.018	0.019	0.021
Adjusted R^2	−0.073	−0.073	−0.104	−0.069	−0.071	−0.071	−0.105
F Statistic	8.700*** (df = 1; 568)	4.544** (df = 2; 565)	2.701* (df = 2; 425)	5.765*** (df = 2; 563)	5.104*** (df = 2; 565)	5.436*** (df = 2; 567)	1.525 (df = 6; 420)

*Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Voice and Accountability (VA) only. (2) Regression with VA and inflation as control. (3) Regression with VA and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with VA and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with VA and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with VA and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with VA and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.*

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 12. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Voice and Accountability for Emerging and Developing Economies*

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | | |
| | Significant civil unrest | | | | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Voice and Accountability Lag	−0.005	−0.012	−0.023	−0.021	−0.005	−0.005	−0.015
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.051)	(0.034)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.063)
Inflation Lag		−0.0001					−0.0005
		(0.0003)					(0.001)
Gini Lag			−0.002				−0.002
			(0.003)				(0.004)
Unemployment Rate Lag				−0.001			−0.004
				(0.002)			(0.004)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag					−0.001		−0.001
					(0.001)		(0.004)
Parliamentary Election						−0.009	−0.008
						(0.010)	(0.024)
Observations	1,889	1,740	668	1,091	1,859	1,889	546
R^2	0.00003	0.0002	0.001	0.001	0.0003	0.0005	0.004
Adjusted R^2	−0.076	−0.082	−0.218	−0.131	−0.078	−0.076	−0.231
F Statistic	0.059 (df = 1; 1754)	0.170 (df = 2; 1607)	0.321 (df = 2; 547)	0.389 (df = 2; 963)	0.267 (df = 2; 1723)	0.434 (df = 2; 1753)	0.307 (df = 6; 441)

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. (1) Regression with Voice and Accountability (VA) only. (2) Regression with VA and inflation as control. (3) Regression with VA and Gini index as control. (4) Regression with VA and unemployment rate as control. (5) Regression with VA and GDP per capita growth as control. (6) Regression with VA and election dummy as control. (7) Regression with VA and all control variables. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions.

Source: Table created by the authors

Appendix J. Linear Probability Model regressions results (civil unrest, geographical subsample)

Table 1. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Asia subsample*

	Dependent variable:					
	Civil unrest					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Government Effectiveness Lag	0.033					
	(0.192)					
Control of Corruption Lag		−0.046				
		(0.167)				
Political Stability Lag			0.137			
			(0.137)			
Regulatory Quality Lag				−0.054		
				(0.146)		
Rule of Law Lag					−0.087	
					(0.185)	
Voice and Accountability Lag						−0.098
						(0.212)
Inflation Lag	0.010	0.009	0.011	0.009	0.009	0.010
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Gini Lag	0.029*	0.029	0.028	0.029	0.028	0.030*
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
Unemployment Rate Lag	−0.006	−0.006	−0.005	−0.006	−0.006	−0.007
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag	−0.004	−0.006	−0.003	−0.006	−0.007	−0.005
	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.011)
Parliamentary Election	−0.044	−0.045	−0.034	−0.047	−0.043	−0.044
	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)	(0.084)
Observations	156	156	156	156	156	156
R^2	0.043	0.043	0.051	0.043	0.044	0.044
Adjusted R^2	- 0.387	- 0.386	- 0.375	- 0.386	- 0.385	- 0.85
F Statistic (df = 6; 107)	0.792	0.800	0.961	0.810	0.825	0.824

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls.
Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 2. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Africa subsample*

	Dependent variable:					
	Civil unrest					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Government Effectiveness Lag	−0.407					
Control of Corruption Lag		1.503				
Political Stability Lag			−1.109			
Regulatory Quality Lag				−0.141		
Rule of Law Lag					0.377	
Voice and Accountability Lag						−1.210
Inflation Lag	−0.267	−0.327	−0.347	−0.279	−0.286	−0.299
Gini Lag	−0.341	−0.355	−0.462	−0.339	−0.318	−0.393
Unemployment Rate Lag	−0.731	−0.899	−1.079	−0.750	−0.728	−0.854
GDP per Capita Growth Lag	0.321	0.286	0.546	0.309	0.288	0.426
Parliamentary Election	−2.685	−3.877	−3.896	−2.794	−2.729	−2.990
Observations	50	50	50	50	50	50
R^2	0.850	0.976	0.920	0.844	0.845	1.000
Adjusted R^2	4.668	1.600	2.963	4.825	4.793	1.001
F Statistic (df = 6; -2)	−1.893	−13.283	−3.828	−1.802	−1.820	−10,863.700

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.

Source: Table created by the authors

Table 3. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Europe subsample*

	Dependent variable:					
	Civil unrest					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Government Effectiveness Lag	−0.085					
	(0.112)					
Control of Corruption Lag		−0.165				
		(0.116)				
Political Stability Lag			−0.052			
			(0.090)			
Regulatory Quality Lag				−0.142		
				(0.121)		
Rule of Law Lag					−0.019	
					(0.149)	
Voice and Accountability Lag						−0.503***
						(0.149)
Inflation Lag	0.001	0.0003	0.001	0.0004	0.001	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Gini Lag	−0.003	−0.002	−0.002	−0.003	−0.003	−0.005
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Unemployment Rate Lag	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.001
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag	−0.002	−0.002	−0.001	−0.002	−0.001	−0.004
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Parliamentary Election	−0.047	−0.044	−0.047	−0.046	−0.047	−0.046
	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)	(0.038)
Observations	593	593	593	593	593	593
R^2	0.005	0.007	0.004	0.006	0.004	0.025
Adjusted R^2	−0.116	−0.113	−0.117	−0.114	−0.117	−0.094
F Statistic (df = 6; 528)	0.410	0.651	0.368	0.545	0.315	2.228**

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 4. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *North America subsample*

	Dependent variable:					
	Civil unrest					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Government Effectiveness Lag	0.364					
	(0.343)					
Control of Corruption Lag		0.333				
		(0.379)				
Political Stability Lag			−0.385			
			(0.320)			
Regulatory Quality Lag				0.292		
				(0.408)		
Rule of Law Lag					0.337	
					(0.410)	
Voice and Accountability Lag						−0.817*
						(0.489)
Inflation Lag	0.014	0.010	0.010	0.015	0.014	0.011
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Gini Lag	0.001	0.001	−0.008	−0.004	−0.008	−0.004
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Unemployment Rate Lag	−0.016	−0.031	−0.021	−0.017	−0.013	−0.021
	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.024)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag	−0.005	−0.011	−0.013	−0.003	−0.002	−0.003
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.029)
Parliamentary Election	0.110	0.109	0.120	0.116	0.109	0.103
	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.098)	(0.097)	(0.096)
Observations	126	126	126	126	126	126
R^2	0.064	0.061	0.068	0.058	0.060	0.082
Adjusted R^2	−0.329	−0.334	−0.324	−0.338	−0.336	−0.305
F Statistic (df = 6; 88)	1.010	0.947	1.067	0.902	0.931	1.302

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 5. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *South America subsample*

	Dependent variable:					
	Civil unrest					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Government Effectiveness Lag	0.402*					
	(0.217)					
Control of Corruption Lag		−0.509**				
		(0.221)				
Political Stability Lag			−0.038			
			(0.160)			
Regulatory Quality Lag				−0.129		
				(0.174)		
Rule of Law Lag					−0.024	
					(0.207)	
Voice and Accountability Lag						−0.552
						(0.376)
Inflation Lag	0.002	−0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Gini Lag	0.009	0.019	0.004	0.009	0.006	0.016
	(0.020)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Unemployment Rate Lag	0.010	0.042	0.032	0.034	0.030	0.041
	(0.040)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.040)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag	0.020	0.028	0.022	0.022	0.021	0.024
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
Parliamentary Election	−0.151**	−0.190***	−0.164**	−0.159**	−0.162**	−0.167**
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.069)
Observations	97	97	97	97	97	97
R^2	0.158	0.181	0.112	0.119	0.112	0.141
Adjusted R^2	−0.284	−0.249	−0.353	−0.342	−0.353	−0.309
F Statistic (df = 6; 63)	1.963*	2.315**	1.330	1.422	1.322	1.724

*Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.*
Source: Table created by the authors

Appendix K. Linear Probability Model regressions results (violent civil unrest, geographical subsample)

Table 1. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Asia subsample*

	Dependent variable:					
	Violent civil unrest					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Government Effectiveness Lag	0.357					
	(0.235)					
Control of Corruption Lag		−0.111				
		(0.207)				
Political Stability Lag			0.046			
			(0.170)			
Regulatory Quality Lag				0.227		
				(0.180)		
Rule of Law Lag					0.387*	
					(0.227)	
Voice and Accountability Lag						−0.303
						(0.261)
Inflation Lag	−0.005	−0.009	−0.007	−0.004	−0.002	−0.007
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Gini Lag	−0.012	−0.014	−0.014	−0.013	−0.010	−0.010
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Unemployment Rate Lag	0.005	0.007	0.006	0.004	0.005	0.001
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.017)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag	−0.004	−0.018	−0.014	−0.010	−0.006	−0.017
	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.014)
Parliamentary Election	0.072	0.072	0.078	0.089	0.074	0.073
	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.103)
Observations	156	156	156	156	156	156
R^2	0.047	0.030	0.028	0.041	0.053	0.039
Adjusted R^2	−0.380	−0.406	−0.408	−0.389	−0.372	−0.392
F Statistic (df = 6; 107)	0.889	0.545	0.508	0.770	0.996	0.727

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.
Source: Table created by the authors

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Table 2. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Africa subsample*

	Dependent variable:					
	Civil unrest					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Government Effectiveness Lag	−0.520					
Control of Corruption Lag		1.796				
Political Stability Lag			−1.290			
Regulatory Quality Lag				−0.197		
Rule of Law Lag					0.506	
Voice and Accountability Lag						−1.434
Inflation Lag	−0.179	−0.252	−0.273	−0.194	−0.203	−0.217
Gini Lag	−0.182	−0.199	−0.322	−0.180	−0.152	−0.243
Unemployment Rate Lag	−0.635	−0.837	−1.042	−0.660	−0.629	−0.783
GDP per Capita Growth Lag	0.295	0.253	0.556	0.280	0.252	0.418
Parliamentary Election	−4.101	−5.534	−5.522	−4.241	−4.154	−4.473
Observations	50	50	50	50	50	50
R^2	0.911	0.986	0.950	0.906	0.907	1000
Adjusted R^2	3189	1331	2224	3294	3271	1.000
F Statistic (df = 6; -2)	−3.398	−24.345	−6.340	−3.227	−3.263	−193,649.100

*Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.*
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 3. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Europe subsample*

	Dependent variable:					
	Violent civil unrest					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Government Effectiveness Lag	0.057					
	(0.097)					
Control of Corruption Lag		0.011				
		(0.101)				
Political Stability Lag			−0.106			
			(0.078)			
Regulatory Quality Lag				−0.009		
				(0.105)		
Rule of Law Lag					0.125	
					(0.130)	
Voice and Accountability Lag						−0.034
						(0.131)
Inflation Lag	0.001	0.001	0.0004	0.001	0.001	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Gini Lag	−0.026***	−0.027***	−0.026***	−0.027***	−0.026***	−0.027***
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Unemployment Rate Lag	0.019***	0.019***	0.018***	0.018***	0.020***	0.018***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag	−0.008	−0.009	−0.008	−0.009	−0.008	−0.009
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Parliamentary Election	−0.030	−0.030	−0.029	−0.030	−0.031	−0.030
	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.033)
Observations	593	593	593	593	593	593
R^2	0.032	0.032	0.035	0.031	0.033	0.032
Adjusted R^2	−0.085	−0.086	−0.082	−0.086	−0.084	−0.086
F Statistic (df = 6; 528)	2.919***	2.863***	3.176***	2.862***	3.022***	2.872***

*Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.*
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 4. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *North America subsample*

	Dependent variable:					
	Violent civil unrest					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Government Effectiveness Lag	0.279					
	(0.342)					
Control of Corruption Lag		0.526				
		(0.374)				
Political Stability Lag			−0.630**			
			(0.313)			
Regulatory Quality Lag				−0.409		
				(0.405)		
Rule of Law Lag					−0.016	
					(0.409)	
Voice and Accountability Lag						−1.095**
						(0.480)
Inflation Lag	0.011	0.005	0.006	0.009	0.011	0.007
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Gini Lag	−0.010	−0.003	−0.018	−0.019	−0.015	−0.013
	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.022)	(0.021)
Unemployment Rate Lag	0.008	−0.016	0.0003	0.009	0.007	0.001
	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.023)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag	0.019	0.009	0.005	0.019	0.020	0.021
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.028)
Parliamentary Election	−0.093	−0.095	−0.077	−0.101	−0.093	−0.103
	(0.097)	(0.096)	(0.095)	(0.097)	(0.097)	(0.094)
Observations	126	126	126	126	126	126
R^2	0.040	0.053	0.075	0.043	0.032	0.086
Adjusted R^2	−0.364	−0.345	−0.314	−0.359	−0.375	−0.298
F Statistic (df = 6; 88)	0.603	0.828	1.185	0.665	0.489	1.385

*Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.*
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 5. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *South America subsample*

	Dependent variable:					
	Violent civil unrest					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Government Effectiveness Lag	0.249					
	(0.385)					
Control of Corruption Lag		0.188				
		(0.398)				
Political Stability Lag			−0.122			
			(0.276)			
Regulatory Quality Lag				−0.033		
				(0.303)		
Rule of Law Lag					0.245	
					(0.358)	
Voice and Accountability Lag						−0.686
						(0.656)
Inflation Lag	0.008	0.009	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.009
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Gini Lag	−0.019	−0.027	−0.023	−0.021	−0.034	−0.008
	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.038)
Unemployment Rate Lag	−0.007	0.0001	0.015	0.006	−0.003	0.019
	(0.072)	(0.070)	(0.073)	(0.070)	(0.070)	(0.070)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag	−0.008	−0.010	−0.003	−0.007	−0.007	−0.004
	(0.032)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.032)	(0.032)
Parliamentary Election	0.038	0.041	0.025	0.031	0.030	0.025
	(0.121)	(0.123)	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.120)
Observations	97	97	97	97	97	97
R^2	0.032	0.029	0.029	0.026	0.033	0.043
Adjusted R^2	−0.475	−0.479	−0.480	−0.484	−0.473	−0.459
F Statistic (df = 6; 63)	0.351	0.318	0.313	0.282	0.360	0.466

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.
Source: Table created by the authors

Appendix L. Linear Probability Model regressions results (significant civil unrest, geographical subsample)

Table 1. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Asia subsample*

	Dependent variable:					
	Significant civil unrest					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Government Effectiveness Lag	0.049					
	(0.106)					
Control of Corruption Lag		−0.087				
		(0.092)				
Political Stability Lag			−0.044			
			(0.076)			
Regulatory Quality Lag				−0.030		
				(0.081)		
Rule of Law Lag					−0.114	
					(0.102)	
Voice and Accountability Lag						−0.024
						(0.117)
Inflation Lag	−0.002	−0.003	−0.002	−0.002	−0.004	−0.002
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Gini Lag	−0.013	−0.013	−0.013	−0.013	−0.014	−0.013
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Unemployment Rate Lag	0.005	0.006	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag	−0.002	−0.006	−0.004	−0.004	−0.006	−0.004
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.006)
Parliamentary Election	0.042	0.040	0.039	0.040	0.043	0.042
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.046)
Observations	156	156	156	156	156	156
R^2	0.033	0.039	0.034	0.033	0.043	0.032
Adjusted R^2	−0.400	−0.391	−0.399	−0.401	−0.387	−0.402
F Statistic (df = 6; 107)	0.617	0.733	0.636	0.604	0.796	0.587

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls.
Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 2. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Africa subsample*

	Dependent variable:					
	Significant civil unrest					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Government Effectiveness Lag	−1.256					
Control of Corruption Lag		0.999				
Political Stability Lag			0.259			
Regulatory Quality Lag				−0.926		
Rule of Law Lag					1.856	
Voice and Accountability Lag						−0.492
Inflation Lag	−0.025	−0.097	−0.050	−0.058	−0.091	−0.073
Gini Lag	−0.076	−0.075	−0.034	−0.079	0.030	−0.086
Unemployment Rate Lag	−0.131	−0.284	−0.106	−0.202	−0.085	−0.227
GDP per Capita Growth Lag	0.059	0.004	−0.038	0.031	−0.075	0.066
Parliamentary Election	−0.245	−1.302	−0.325	−0.583	−0.262	−0.662
Observations	50	50	50	50	50	50
R^2	0.969	0.915	0.743	0.945	0.952	0.812
Adjusted R^2	1747	3088	7298	2356	2168	5612
F Statistic (df = 6; -2)	−10.595	−3.578	−0.963	−5.690	−6.660	−1.438

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 3. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Europe subsample*

	Dependent variable:					
	Significant civil unrest					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Government Effectiveness Lag	0.031					
	(0.076)					
Control of Corruption Lag		0.094				
		(0.079)				
Political Stability Lag			−0.053			
			(0.061)			
Regulatory Quality Lag				0.027		
				(0.082)		
Rule of Law Lag					−0.018	
					(0.101)	
Voice and Accountability Lag						−0.090
						(0.102)
Inflation Lag	−0.0003	−0.0002	−0.001	−0.0004	−0.0004	−0.0002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Gini Lag	−0.014*	−0.014*	−0.014*	−0.014*	−0.014*	−0.015**
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Unemployment Rate Lag	−0.001	−0.001	−0.002	−0.001	−0.002	−0.002
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003	−0.004
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Parliamentary Election	−0.027	−0.029	−0.027	−0.028	−0.027	−0.027
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Observations	592	592	592	592	592	592
R^2	0.013	0.015	0.014	0.013	0.013	0.014
Adjusted R^2	−0.107	−0.104	−0.106	−0.107	−0.107	−0.106
F Statistic (df = 6; 528)	1.140	1.351	1.238	1.129	1.117	1.244

*Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.*
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 4. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *North America subsample*

	Dependent variable:					
	Significant civil unrest					
Government Effectiveness Lag	0.063					
	(0.168)					
Control of Corruption Lag		−0.057				
		(0.185)				
Political Stability Lag			−0.223			
			(0.155)			
Regulatory Quality Lag				0.251		
				(0.198)		
Rule of Law Lag					−0.222	
					(0.199)	
Voice and Accountability Lag						−0.005
						(0.242)
Inflation Lag	0.006	0.006	0.004	0.007	0.005	0.006
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Gini Lag	−0.006	−0.009	−0.008	−0.005	−0.006	−0.007
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Unemployment Rate Lag	−0.021*	−0.019	−0.024**	−0.022*	−0.023**	−0.021*
	(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag	0.034**	0.035**	0.029*	0.035**	0.033**	0.034**
	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Parliamentary Election	−0.036	−0.035	−0.030	−0.031	−0.035	−0.036
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.048)
Observations	126	126	126	126	126	126
R^2	0.148	0.147	0.166	0.162	0.158	0.146
Adjusted R^2	−0.210	−0.211	−0.185	−0.191	−0.195	−0.212
F Statistic (df = 6; 88)	2.544**	2.536**	2.921**	2.832**	2.761**	2.517**

*Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.*
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 5. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *South America subsample*

	Dependent variable:					
	Significant civil unrest					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Government Effectiveness Lag	0.020					
	(0.088)					
Control of Corruption Lag		0.052				
		(0.090)				
Political Stability Lag			−0.048			
			(0.062)			
Regulatory Quality Lag				−0.034		
				(0.069)		
Rule of Law Lag					0.003	
					(0.081)	
Voice and Accountability Lag						0.074
						(0.150)
Inflation Lag	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Gini Lag	0.022**	0.020**	0.021**	0.023***	0.021**	0.020**
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Unemployment Rate Lag	0.005	0.004	0.010	0.007	0.006	0.004
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag	−0.005	−0.006	−0.004	−0.005	−0.005	−0.006
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Parliamentary Election	−0.037	−0.035	−0.040	−0.037	−0.037	−0.037
	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.027)
Observations	97	97	97	97	97	97
R^2	0.139	0.143	0.146	0.142	0.138	0.142
Adjusted R^2	−0.312	−0.306	−0.301	−0.308	−0.313	−0.308
F Statistic (df = 6; 63)	1.696	1.751	1.798	1.733	1.686	1.734

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 1. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Full Democracies subsample*

	Dependent variable:					
	Civil unrest					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Government Effectiveness Lag	0.050					
	(0.165)					
Control of Corruption Lag		0.029				
		(0.154)				
Political Stability Lag			−0.205**			
			(0.122)			
Regulatory Quality Lag				−0.160		
				(0.160)		
Rule of Law Lag					−0.014	
					(0.208)	
Voice and Accountability Lag						−0.286
						(0.285)
Inflation Lag	0.043***	0.043***	0.042***	0.044***	0.043***	0.040**
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Gini Lag	0.040**	0.040**	0.038**	0.039**	0.039**	0.039**
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Unemployment Rate Lag	0.011	0.010	0.008	0.006	0.010	0.007
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.009)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.005	0.004
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Parliamentary Election	−0.006	−0.007	−0.003	−0.006	−0.006	−0.004
	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.046)	(0.047)	(0.047)	(0.047)
Observations	325	325	325	325	325	325
R^2	0.050	0.050	0.060	0.054	0.050	0.054
Adjusted R^2	−0.107	−0.107	−0.096	−0.103	−0.107	−0.103
F Statistic (df = 6; 278)	2.463**	2.453**	2.946***	2.623**	2.448**	2.623**

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 2. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Flawed Democracies subsample*

	Dependent variable:					
	Civil unrest					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Government Effectiveness Lag	0.098					
	(0.110)					
Control of Corruption Lag		0.020				
		(0.093)				
Political Stability Lag			−0.059			
			(0.086)			
Regulatory Quality Lag				−0.064		
				(0.096)		
Rule of Law Lag					0.055	
					(0.118)	
Voice and Accountability Lag						−0.319**
						(0.128)
Inflation Lag	0.001	0.0004	0.0002	0.0003	0.0004	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Gini Lag	0.003	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Unemployment Rate Lag	−0.009	−0.009	−0.008	−0.009	−0.009	−0.007
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag	−0.010	−0.010	−0.011	−0.011	−0.010	−0.012*
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Parliamentary Election	−0.034	−0.034	−0.035	−0.035	−0.035	−0.034
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Observations	579	579	579	579	579	579
R^2	0.010	0.008	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.021
Adjusted R^2	−0.156	−0.158	−0.157	−0.157	−0.158	−0.144
F Statistic (df=6; 495)	0.819	0.694	0.766	0.762	0.722	1727

*Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.*
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 3. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Authoritarian subsample*

	Dependent variable:					
	Civil unrest					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Government Effectiveness Lag	- 0.253					
	(0.290)					
Control of Corruption Lag		- 1.025**				
		(0.401)				
Political Stability Lag			0.195			
			(0.206			
Regulatory Quality Lag				- 0.306		
				(0.325)		
Rule of Law Lag					- 0.407	
					(0.342)	
Voice and Accountability Lag						0.247
						(0.333)
Inflation Lag	0.004	0.002	0.004*	0.004	0.004*	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Gini Lag	0.010	0.008	0.013	0.010	0.007	0.014
	(0.023)	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)
Unemployment Rate Lag	0.041	0.032	0.044	0.037	0.031	0.035
	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.027)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag	0.017	0.010	0.022	0.022	0.016	0.021
	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Parliamentary Election	0.064	0.044	0.063	0.065	0.063	0.070
	(0.132)	(0.126)	(0.131)	(0.132)	(0.131)	(0.132)
Observations	110	110	110	110	110	110
R^2	0.100	0.183	0.102	0.102	0.110	0.097
Adjusted R^2	−0.751	−0.590	−0.747	−0.748	−0.732	−0.758
F Statistic (df = 6; 56)	1.040	2.092*	1.065	1.062	1.158	1.000

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.
Source: Table created by the authors

Appendix N. Linear Probability Model regressions results (violent civil unrest, political regime subsample)

Table 1. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Full Democracies subsample*

	Dependent variable:					
	Violent civil unrest					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Government Effectiveness Lag	0.111					
	(0.168)					
Control of Corruption Lag		−0.094				
		(0.157)				
Political Stability Lag			−0.276**			
			(0.124)			
Regulatory Quality Lag				−0.056		
				(0.163)		
Rule of Law Lag					−0.068	
					(0.212)	
Voice and Accountability Lag						−0.376
						(0.290)
Inflation Lag	0.015	0.012	0.013	0.014	0.014	0.010
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Gini Lag	−0.009	−0.011	−0.012	−0.010	−0.010	−0.010
	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Unemployment Rate Lag	0.028***	0.026***	0.025***	0.026***	0.026***	0.023**
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.010)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.001
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Parliamentary Election	0.017	0.020	0.021	0.017	0.018	0.020
	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.048)
Observations	325	325	325	325	325	325
R^2	0.035	0.034	0.050	0.034	0.034	0.039
Adjusted R^2	−0.125	−0.125	−0.107	−0.126	−0.126	−0.120
F Statistic (df=6; 278)	1.664	1.650	2.446**	1.609	1.607	1.878*

*Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.*
Source: Table created by the authors

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Table 2. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Flawed Democracies subsample*

	Dependent variable:					
	Violent civil unrest					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Government Effectiveness Lag	0.162					
	(0.109)					
Control of Corruption Lag		0.118				
		(0.092)				
Political Stability Lag			−0.161*			
			(0.085)			
Regulatory Quality Lag				0.084		
				(0.095)		
Rule of Law Lag					0.222*	
					(0.117)	
Voice and Accountability Lag						−0.200
						(0.127)
Inflation Lag	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Gini Lag	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.001
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Unemployment Rate Lag	−0.001	−0.002	−0.0003	−0.0003	−0.001	0.0003
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag	−0.017**	−0.017**	−0.019***	−0.017**	−0.015**	−0.019***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Parliamentary Election	−0.005	−0.005	−0.009	−0.006	−0.008	−0.006
	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)	(0.040)
Observations	579	579	579	579	579	579
R^2	0.023	0.022	0.026	0.020	0.026	0.024
Adjusted R^2	−0.141	−0.142	−0.138	−0.144	−0.138	−0.140
F Statistic (df=6; 495)	1.951*	1.850*	2.183**	1.706	2.186**	1.990*

*Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.*
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 3. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Authoritarian subsample*

	Dependent variable:					
	Violent civil unrest					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Government Effectiveness Lag	−0.036					
	(0.321)					
Control of Corruption Lag		−0.581				
		(0.461)				
Political Stability Lag			0.445**			
			(0.221)			
Regulatory Quality Lag				−0.036		
				(0.361)		
Rule of Law Lag					0.188	
					(0.381)	
Voice and Accountability Lag						0.049
						(0.369)
Inflation Lag	0.005*	0.004	0.006**	0.005*	0.005*	0.005*
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Gini Lag	−0.034	−0.037	−0.034	−0.034	−0.031	−0.033
	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.025)
Unemployment Rate Lag	0.048	0.047	0.077**	0.047	0.046	0.047
	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.030)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag	0.003	−0.004	0.004	0.003	0.006	0.003
	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Parliamentary Election	−0.003	−0.014	−0.004	−0.003	−0.003	−0.002
	(0.146)	(0.144)	(0.141)	(0.146)	(0.146)	(0.146)
Observations	110	110	110	110	110	110
R^2	0.102	0.127	0.163	0.102	0.106	0.102
Adjusted R^2	−0.748	−0.700	−0.630	−0.748	−0.741	−0.748
F Statistic (df = 6; 56)	1.059	1.352	1.811	1.059	1.102	1.060

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 1. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Full Democracies subsample*

	Dependent variable:					
	Significant civil unrest					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Government Effectiveness Lag	0.061					
	(0.108)					
Control of Corruption Lag		0.102				
		(0.101)				
Political Stability Lag			−0.128			
			(0.080)			
Regulatory Quality Lag				0.048		
				(0.105)		
Rule of Law Lag					−0.063	
					(0.137)	
Voice and Accountability Lag						−0.076
						(0.188)
Inflation Lag	0.005	0.006	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.004
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.011)
Gini Lag	−0.009	−0.009	−0.010	−0.009	−0.009	−0.009
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Unemployment Rate Lag	0.004	0.005	0.002	0.005	0.003	0.002
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Parliamentary Election	−0.009	−0.011	−0.007	−0.008	−0.008	−0.008
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.031)
Observations	325	325	325	325	325	325
R^2	0.005	0.007	0.013	0.005	0.005	0.004
Adjusted R^2	−0.160	−0.157	−0.150	−0.160	−0.160	−0.160
F Statistic (df = 6; 278)	0.232	0.349	0.607	0.213	0.213	0.206

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls.
Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 2. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *Flawed Democracies subsample*

	Dependent variable:					
	Significant civil unrest					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Government Effectiveness Lag	0.055					
	(0.071)					
Control of Corruption Lag		0.036				
		(0.060)				
Political Stability Lag			−0.070			
			(0.055)			
Regulatory Quality Lag				0.027		
				(0.061)		
Rule of Law Lag					0.013	
					(0.076)	
Voice and Accountability Lag						−0.045
						(0.083)
Inflation Lag	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Gini Lag	−0.005	−0.006	−0.006	−0.005	−0.006	−0.006
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Unemployment Rate Lag	−0.005	−0.005	−0.005	−0.005	−0.005	−0.004
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag	−0.006	−0.007	−0.007	−0.006	−0.007	−0.007
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Parliamentary Election	−0.030	−0.030	−0.031	−0.030	−0.031	−0.030
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Observations	578	578	578	578	578	578
R^2	0.013	0.012	0.015	0.012	0.012	0.012
Adjusted R^2	−0.153	−0.154	−0.151	−0.154	−0.154	−0.154
F Statistic (df = 6; 494)	1.076	1.034	1.244	1.008	0.980	1.025

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 1. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *civil unrest before 2009*

	Dependent variable:					
	Civil unrest					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Government Effectiveness Lag	−0.014					
	(0.152)					
Control of Corruption Lag		−0.145				
		(0.148)				
Political Stability Lag			−0.333***			
			(0.116)			
Regulatory Quality Lag				−0.051		
				(0.146)		
Rule of Law Lag					−0.234	
					(0.196)	
Voice and Accountability Lag						−0.431***
						(0.165)
Inflation Lag	0.0003	0.0003	−0.001	0.0002	0.0004	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Gini Lag	0.016	0.014	0.012	0.017	0.015	0.017
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Unemployment Rate Lag	0.016	0.019*	0.019*	0.017	0.019*	0.021*
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag	−0.001	−0.001	0.001	−0.002	−0.002	−0.001
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Parliamentary Election	−0.058	−0.058	−0.053	−0.058	−0.058	−0.057
	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.049)	(0.048)
Observations	384	384	384	384	384	384
R^2	0.019	0.022	0.047	0.020	0.024	0.042
Adjusted R^2	−0.327	−0.323	−0.290	−0.327	−0.321	−0.296
F Statistic (df = 6; 283)	0.924	1.084	2.318**	0.943	1.164	2.081*

*Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.*
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 2. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *civil unrest after 2009*

	Dependent variable:					
	Civil unrest					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Government Effectiveness Lag	0.217*					
	(0.126)					
Control of Corruption Lag		0.032				
		(0.133)				
Political Stability Lag			−0.020			
			(0.092)			
Regulatory Quality Lag				0.063		
				(0.148)		
Rule of Law Lag					0.122	
					(0.156)	
Voice and Accountability Lag						−0.524***
						(0.189)
Inflation Lag	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Gini Lag	0.007	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.007	0.007
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Unemployment Rate Lag	−0.005	−0.006	−0.006	−0.006	−0.006	−0.006
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag	−0.002	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003	−0.002	−0.005
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Parliamentary Election	−0.025	−0.024	−0.024	−0.023	−0.026	−0.020
	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.037)
Observations	638	638	638	638	638	638
R^2	0.011	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.007	0.020
Adjusted R^2	−0.191	−0.197	−0.197	−0.197	−0.196	−0.180
F Statistic (df = 6; 529)	0.996	0.504	0.503	0.525	0.596	1.775

*Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.*
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 3. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *violent civil unrest before 2009*

	Dependent variable:					
	Violent civil unrest					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Government Effectiveness Lag	0.328*					
	(0.167)					
Control of Corruption Lag		0.111				
		(0.164)				
Political Stability Lag			−0.297**			
			(0.129)			
Regulatory Quality Lag				0.348**		
				(0.160)		
Rule of Law Lag					0.127	
					(0.217)	
Voice and Accountability Lag						−0.137
						(0.184)
Inflation Lag	−0.001	−0.0001	−0.001	0.0001	−0.0001	0.0004
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Gini Lag	0.004	0.002	−0.003	−0.0002	0.001	0.001
	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Unemployment Rate Lag	0.006	0.008	0.013	0.009	0.009	0.012
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag	−0.015	−0.015	−0.013	−0.012	−0.014	−0.015
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.010)
Parliamentary Election	0.036	0.034	0.038	0.034	0.034	0.034
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.054)
Observations	384	384	384	384	384	384
R^2	0.026	0.014	0.031	0.029	0.013	0.014
Adjusted R^2	−0.319	−0.335	−0.312	−0.315	−0.335	−0.334
F Statistic (df = 6; 283)	1.240	0.665	1.486	1.386	0.645	0.681

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 4. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *violent civil unrest after 2009*

	Dependent variable:					
	Violent civil unrest					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Government Effectiveness Lag	0.240**					
	(0.117)					
Control of Corruption Lag		0.137				
		(0.124)				
Political Stability Lag			−0.100			
			(0.085)			
Regulatory Quality Lag				0.023		
				(0.138)		
Rule of Law Lag					0.274*	
					(0.145)	
Voice and Accountability Lag						−0.279
						(0.177)
Inflation Lag	0.004**	0.004*	0.004*	0.004*	0.004*	0.004*
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Gini Lag	−0.013	−0.015	−0.014	−0.013	−0.013	−0.013
	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Unemployment Rate Lag	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.006	0.008	0.007
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag	−0.002	−0.004	−0.005	−0.004	−0.002	−0.005
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Parliamentary Election	−0.057	−0.057	−0.056	−0.055	−0.060*	−0.053
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)
Observations	638	638	638	638	638	638
R^2	0.024	0.018	0.019	0.016	0.023	0.021
Adjusted R^2	−0.175	−0.182	−0.182	−0.185	−0.177	−0.179
F Statistic (df = 6; 529)	2.158**	1.651	1.678	1.450	2.049*	1.865*

Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 5. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *significant civil unrest before 2009*

	Dependent variable:					
	Significant civil unrest					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Government Effectiveness Lag	0.024					
	(0.104)					
Control of Corruption Lag		−0.075				
		(0.102)				
Political Stability Lag			−0.218***			
			(0.080)			
Regulatory Quality Lag				−0.066		
				(0.100)		
Rule of Law Lag					−0.241*	
					(0.134)	
Voice and Accountability Lag						−0.062
						(0.114)
Inflation Lag	−0.0002	−0.0002	−0.001	−0.0002	−0.0001	−0.00004
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Gini Lag	−0.012	−0.014	−0.015*	−0.012	−0.014	−0.012
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Unemployment Rate Lag	0.005	0.006	0.007	0.005	0.008	0.006
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag	−0.001	−0.001	0.0004	−0.002	−0.002	−0.001
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Parliamentary Election	−0.075**	−0.075**	−0.072**	−0.075**	−0.075**	−0.075**
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.034)
Observations	384	384	384	384	384	384
R^2	0.027	0.029	0.052	0.029	0.038	0.028
Adjusted R^2	−0.316	−0.314	−0.282	−0.315	−0.302	−0.315
F Statistic (df = 6; 283)	1.326	1.410	2.609**	1.392	1.872*	1.368

*Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.*
Source: Table created by the authors

Table 6. Linear Probability Model regressions results for *significant civil unrest after 2009*

	Dependent variable:					
	Significant civil unrest					
Government Effectiveness Lag	0.073					
	(0.076)					
Control of Corruption Lag		0.063				
		(0.080)				
Political Stability Lag			0.012			
			(0.055)			
Regulatory Quality Lag				0.006		
				(0.089)		
Rule of Law Lag					−0.057	
					(0.094)	
Voice and Accountability Lag						−0.199*
						(0.114)
Inflation Lag	−0.0002	−0.0002	−0.0003	−0.0003	−0.0002	−0.0003
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Gini Lag	−0.007	−0.008	−0.007	−0.007	−0.007	−0.007
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Unemployment Rate Lag	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003	−0.003
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
GDP per Capita Growth Lag	−0.001	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Parliamentary Election	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.007	0.008
	(0.022)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Observations	637	637	637	637	637	637
R^2	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.009
Adjusted R^2	−0.198	−0.199	−0.200	−0.200	−0.199	−0.193
F Statistic (df = 6; 528)	0.467	0.415	0.320	0.313	0.374	0.823

*Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. The results are presented only for the regressions with all the controls. Time and country Fixed Effects are present in all regressions. All regressors are lagged.*
Source: Table created by the authors